Aftershock Action Alliance

Practical Anarchy During Recovery from Hurrican Irene

2011-09-21T19:21:00.001-04:00

Days after the Hurricane Irene damaged large parts of Central Vermont this little soap company sent out an e-mail to its vendors and customers. The e-mail then was forwarded to many others. The message starts with the damage caused to the region where the soap factory was and how regular citizens helped each other.

"Hurricane Irene came through anddumped nine feet of water on us in a single day. Water levels rose slowly forseveral hours, and then jumped dramatically higher. Within 15 minutesoverworked culverts failed, and then were tossed aside like candy wrappers. Ahundred bridges collapsed in Central VT including 15 covered bridges that hadstood for nearly 150 years. Our little town of Rochester (pop 1200 on weekends)was completely cut off from the outside world. Electricity failed, but ourtown's well made water system worked continuously through the crisis. The sewerplant shut down and sewer mains were washed aside like the overwhelmed culvertsthat, once gone, left ten foot deep gashes across our main roads, secondaryroads, and driveways.One of our friends lost their homewhen it crashed down into the raging brook. I had dropped off one of theirdaughters (who works for my wife at her Bakery) just an hour before.

Our town was completely alone.Everyone squared away their families as best they could and got to work.People, who cooked, cooked. People who ran heavy equipment jumped in.Organizers organized, volunteers volunteered, and everyone shared what theyhad. We kept the Bakery open, making French bread and bagels and soothingfrayed nerves. People who had money paid. People with credit wrote it down.Everyone who worked or was devastated could eat for free."

What Larry experienced is not surprising, it happens in most disasters large and small in every culture and country. People come together and work together during times of crisis. What is interesting about this message is it shows how anarchy can be a powerful force in disaster rescue and recovery for US communities.

"I learned what anarchy is duringthose three days. Anarchy is not rioting in the streets. Anarchy is notpillaging and looting. Anarchy is when your buddy jumps out of the truck andstarts directing traffic while something is going on, and then leaves when theoperation is completed. Anarchy is feeding people because they are hungry andgiving them showers because they are dirty. Then you continue doing what youwere doing before you stopped doing that and did the thing that needed doing atthat moment."

Larry goes on to write about the official response by various government agencies that failed to respond to the actual needs of the people. If you want to read the entire message which is very honest and well-written check out their web site at:

www.vermontsoap.com

NYC's Response to Irene Not "Picture Perfect"

2011-09-21T19:07:00.000-04:00

Just 36 hours after Irene left the streets ofManhattan, soggy Governor Cuomo was calling the response to the tropical storm,by both the city and the state, “Picture Perfect.” Most in the media agreed sayingthe city’s week long preparations were a new model of preparedness. The truthis that this so-called new model was not tested and from preliminary reports itdid not work as advertised by the politicians. The city found itself short of1,000 key city employees and had to ask the Governor to call in the NationalGuard-- 900 were sent to the five boroughs to pick up the slack. Of these 900,only about one quarter of them arrived by Sunday morning and a full 30% did notarrive until Sunday evening, long after the storm had moved north and west ofthe city. An interesting article, written by an EMT first responder, was postedto the blog capitalnewyork.com.

On the Thursday evening before thestorm hit, EMT Kevin Heldman received a robo-call from the Office of EmergencyManagement (OEM). The call asked if he was available for disaster work and heanswered yes, but then somehow Kevin got lost in the OEM’s bureaucracy. This ishow he described it:

“I called the 718 number that called me andwas told the mailbox was full or not accepting messages. I called 311repeatedly and they had absolutely no information about where I should report,what agency was coordinating the response efforts, or who I should call. Iasked different operators, and asked to speak to supervisors. No luck.

I finally got a second robo-call, andwas told to report to City College in Harlem on 137th Street at 10 a.m. for a12-hour shift.”

“The city was using the gym as ashelter. We stood around for a long while with nothing to do, because no onewas in charge. The City College athletic director came in. She wanted to makesure her floor was OK. She got people to come in and cover the volleyball courtand told us the roof was leaking in a number of different places and that ifthe rain got bad so might the leaks. (This was in a hurricane shelter.)

There was a teacher who was head ofscience research at Stuyvesant. He and I went up to the roof to check it out.People were still working up there. There were numerous construction projectsin progress with large amounts of material all over the place—the stuff thatyou would want secured or lashed down if you thought a hurricane was coming. Weasked two workers whether they were going to be taking care of that. They saidthey didn’t know; their supervisor was out and would be back later.”

Youmay remember an earlier post that we discussed how the city had spent a ton ofcash on buying complicated shortwave radios for the schools in times ofdisasters but the state refused to fund any training. Well Kevin experiencedthat also during his adventure at the OEM sponsored hurricane shelter:

“He[a science teacher with no training] was made our head of communications [bythe two random CERT volunteers], even though he didn’t know how to put together,charge or operate any of the brand new radios he and I were taking out of theirpackages, putting together and charging.”

In fact, one year after the radioswere bought, an audit found that nearly twenty percent had disappeared and amajority of school officials had no idea where they were in their buildings. Soit is not surprising they could not get the radios functioning, it is more surprisingthat they found them at all.

OEM claims that there are strictprotocols for dealing with volunteers, going so far as to send out hundreds ofDVDs about “Volunteer Orientation” to shelters. The video shows a strictcommand structure with everyone going about their business and reporting toothers. The truth at the shelters was very different:

“For a few hours, we sat there withnothing to do, meeting with various administrators who came in and also didn’tknow what was going on or where we were supposed to go the next day, when thestorm was supposed to hit with full force. A police officer came in at one point,stayed for a minute and left. The volunteers started leaving [the CERTvolunteers had already left by 2am].”

Kevin was eventually redeployed toone of the larger evacuation centers at John Jay College. He was assigned tothe medical team and found out firsthand how ill-prepared the centers were todeal with the many disabled evacuees. This despite having the largestdeployment of medical, CERT and even National Guardsmen of any of theevacuation centers in Manhattan. Here is one almost comical episode:

“A number of people at the shelter werediabetic and had to be checked and there was only one glucometer. I asked thenurse using the glucometer if it would it help if there was another one and shesaid that yes, of course it would. So I was back in Roosevelt E.R. asking theoperations manager whether she could possibly spare one.

After a while, she checked and told methat no, I couldn’t borrow a glucometer because all of theirs were built intounits. I asked whether I could take one from one of the Roosevelt ambulances.She said she would try that, and then another administrator got involved, andhe tried to open an ambulance door, but it was locked. He made some phone callsbut couldn’t get in touch with anyone. I left my cell-phone number, asked him toplease call me when he heard anything. Back in the shelter, maybe 30 minuteslater, he called to tell me that no glucometer was available.

Maybe an hour later, a Rooseveltadministrator, Eileen Yost, showed up to speak with Dr. Long, asking what shecould do to help. When she was walking away, I went up to her and introducedmyself, told her what I had been doing and what had been going on and that whatwe really needed was a glucometer...

Eventually we got our glucometer. Itook it from the hospital to the shelter under my raincoat. Dr. Long saw mepull it out from under my coat and asked whether I stole it. I had to explainthat the very nice Roosevelt administrator had found one for us.

Susan Dietz, the chief nurse and vicepresident of patient care at Roosevelt, had very kindly and patiently showed mehow to use the glucometer, which was a fancy new model unfamiliar to the nursesat the shelter. This was after one of her colleagues, responding to myrequests, had tried to call security to have me thrown out.”

Similar reports made by volunteers andevacuees can be found by trolling the internet. For some reason these voicesnever made it to the mainstream press reports or any of the officialdebriefings made by the OEM. Without these on the ground observations there islittle chance the city will be better prepared next time when we might reallyneed it.

Waffle House and FEMA

2011-09-21T19:04:00.001-04:00

Another example of the professionalism of FEMA. It is true, sad and also absurdly funny - FEMA relies on the menu choices of Waffle House to determine the severity of hurricanes in the US. Yup. Crazy. Read this Wall Street Journal article if you dare. Click here

Radio and Landlines Best Ways to Communicate During Disasters

2011-09-05T18:48:00.001-04:00

An interesting article appeared in today's New York Times about a radio DJ in the Catskills who acted as a conduit of information for people strapped throughout this area of New York. Tropical Storm Irene skirted New York City, only to deluge mountainous New York and Vermont regions with tremendous amounts of rain, causing an estimated 1 billion dollars in damage to towns, farm land, and infrastructure such as roads and bridges--in upstate New York alone. Irene knocked out cell phone towers and the power, leaving battery-operated radios and landlines as the only means of communication for people who watched entire towns and bridges wash away with the force of the water, or who were stuck in the upper stories of their homes, unable to leave.

From the New York Times article:

"About 9 a.m., power and a number of the region’s cellphone towers were knocked out, leaving thousands without any way of communicating. WRIP’s backup generator kicked in, and the phone, an old-fashioned land line, started ringing. It has not stopped since.

For days Mr. Fink, who was soon joined by his colleague Joe Loverro, played matchmaker, soothing stranded residents, taking down numbers to relay to rescue workers and passing on information about makeshift shelters and closed roads. The two personalities and other WRIP employees guided listeners through the arrival of the National Guard, carrying emergency supplies, to towns like Prattsville, and kept people apprised of Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo’s trip on Wednesday to that community, which was devastated by the storm.

People listened, first from radios powered by batteries or generators, and later from their cars as they drove around to survey the damage, which may top $1 billion in New York alone, Mr. Cuomo has estimated.

'I don’t know any emergency numbers, and I really would love to know if anybody can tell me what is happening in Hensonville,” one frantic caller, Joan, said that Sunday. “My son I know is in his house, probably on the second floor, and the neighbors are in their house and I don’t know any number.'"

The article is worth reading, but it is also an important reminder of a few key things one should do to prepare for a disaster:

Make sure you include a radio, along with extra batteries if needed, in your emergency supplies kit or go bag. Look into crank radios, which do not require batteries.
Important radio stations to know: National Weather Service SW 162.4 to 162.5 AM 700; Office of Emergency Management AM 750 FM 89.8; remember to scan throughout the dial for both pirate and local stations which become information resource hubs.
Make an emergency contact list with useful numbers and information (such as radio stations, landline locations) and keep it in a waterproof pouch/bag and keep it in your go bag. Most of us no longer remember numbers, and when your cell phone dies and the power is out, you won't have access to the information on it. Also note, that cell phones in areas outside of the disaster range should still work properly.
No power means no internet, no cable, no VOIP (voice over IP) phone lines. Landlines might be the only means of communication, so, if you do not have one, note down who in your vicinity has access to a real landline (not a cable or internet-based line) which will be useful when you need to get in touch with friends, family, and comrades.
Remember that pay phones should theoretically work after a disaster, so make sure you have quarters in your emergency supplies/go bag. "0" for operator should also work, even if you do not have change on hand.

If you have questions on what other supplies you'll need in your go bag, or how to put one together, click here.

Are Prisoners Expendable during Disasters? FEMA Says Yes.

2011-08-28T16:17:00.001-04:00

This week's disgraceful lack of planning for the more than 12,500 inmates at Riker's Island—as other parts of the city were evacuated for Hurricane Irene—is the rule not the exception when it comes to FEMA's thinking (or lack thereof) for the more than 2.3 million adults and 90,000 juveniles in US prisons. This indifference to over 1% of the population of the US is disgraceful and some prison-reform organizations have rightfully called it a crime against humanity. This callous indifference to the incarcerated is not new or unknown. The Orlean's Parish Prison (OPP)—the good folks in charge of the prisons and jails in New Orleans—have been subjected to over 20 lawsuits from prison groups, lawyers, families and prisoners themselves.

The ACLU report describes a history of neglect at OPP, one of the most dangerous and mismanaged jails in the country. This culture of neglect was evident in the days before Katrina, when the sheriff declared that the prisoners would remain "where they belong," despite the mayor's decision to declare the city's first-ever mandatory evacuation. OPP even accepted prisoners, including juveniles as young as 10, from other prison facilities to ride out Hurricane Katrina . As floodwaters rose in OPP buildings, power was lost, and entire buildings were plunged into darkness. Deputies left their posts wholesale, leaving behind prisoners in locked cells, some standing in sewage-tainted water up to their chests. Prisoners went days without food, water and ventilation, and deputies admit that they received no emergency training and were entirely unaware of any evacuation plan. The prisoners were finally evacuated by order of the state after four and a half days of fear and chaos. The ACLU report follows the prisoners as they were transferred to jails and prisons around Louisiana. Thousands of the male prisoners were first transported to the Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, where they were placed outdoors in a yard with inadequate food, medical care, adequate sanitation or even cots.

Here are just two stories from the transcripts of the ACLU lawsuit against the OPP:

"Renard Reed, a guard at OPP's psychiatric ward who reported to work before the hurricane out of a sense of camaraderie and shared responsibility. Like many other guards, Renard was locked in during his shift to prevent desertion, and was then ordered to go to the roof with a shotgun and shoot anyone trying to leave one of the flooded buildings. He was still stranded at the prison long after the prisoners were evacuated."

"Ashley George, a 13-year-old girl housed in OPP's Youth Center, who was moved to an area adjacent to an adult male holding area where the men watched her use the toilet. As the building began to flood, Ashley spent days in water up to her neck. Adult prisoners rescued Ashley and the other children from the waters. After being taken to the bridge for evacuation, Ashley was lucky enough to be given a bag of potato chips and water. She reports again being forced to relieve herself publicly and that pregnant girls received no assistance or treatment."

Most of Riker's Island is only 20 feet above sea level and connected to Queens by a single bridge. In addition there is a 800 bed floating jail barge—the Vernon C. Bain Correctional Facility—anchored off the north tip of the island. It has no power to move and no propulsion engine. So what is the plan for these nearly 13,000 people (some who are simply awaiting trial because they can't pay bail)? "We are not evacuating Rikers Island," Mayor Michael Bloomberg said in a news conference in which he was demanding the evacuation of 400,000 other New Yorkers and shutting down the subways, buses and airports. Technically Riker's has no flood rating (the famous A, B, C system for determining flood areas) but all the surrounding islands, including uninhabitable ones, are designated an obvious A level—the highest chance of flooding. On late Saturday, just hours before the hurricane was to hit NYC the mayor's office released a statement to stem off complaints from the Legal Aid Society, city council members and prisoner advocacy groups. The statement simply said there was “a sound emergency plan” for Rikers and the prison barge. As of now no one has seen this plan, no details have been released and reporters' attempts to get more details have so far been rebuffed. Mayor Bloomberg's lackadaisical post-hurricane response,“Well, we didn't lose any prisoners or jails,” seems woefully inadequate.

City Shelters are opening for Families with Pets

2011-08-27T14:20:00.007-04:00

Despite previous policies, some shelters (e.g. Ozone Park) are taking in pets. It is unclear at present if all city shelters will but it seems most will provide arrangements for family pets (service animals have always been allow in crisis centers per Federal Law).

Be sure to bring your pets' food, medicines, leash and collar and papers showing shots.
If you have a pet you should make sure you get to the shelter early because your pets need to go through intake with volunteers.
To make sure your shelter takes pets please call 311

For more information on pet preparations for hurricane Irene check out this link: Click here

Some More Tips for Hurricane Irene

2011-08-27T14:02:00.004-04:00

Stay indoors. If you must go outside, stay away from downed and dangling lines. Treat all downed lines as if they are live and dangerous.

If you use a portable generator, follow its important, life-saving instructions. Click here for more information on generators.
Listen to your battery-operated radio on for updates on our restoration progress and safety tips.
Use candles and storm lanterns carefully. Keep them out of drafts, away from flammable materials, and out of the reach of children.
If your power goes out call 1-800-75-CONED (1-800-752-6633).
Unplug appliances in basement or make sure they are at least 18 inches off the floor to avoid fires and electrical shocks.
Water services may be interrupted in some areas so store water ahead of time.
If you expect power failure turn your fridge and freezer to highest setting and avoid opening the door as much as possible.
Click here for step-by-step on turning off gas, water and electricity

Re: Hurricane Irene

2011-08-27T11:58:00.004-04:00

Neighbor,

We know this can be a difficult and confusing time but you are not alone. You live in the most resilient city in the US. If you follow some simple guidelines you can aid yourself, your family and your neighborhood. You and your neighbors are the best emergency resource this city has to offer.

Basics

Make sure you hydrate yourself. Dehydration is one of the most common injuries during a disaster. If you where there is no water, check your ice-cubes, hot water heater, or purify a gallon of water with 3 drops of regular bleach (wait 30 seconds before drinking). Also make sure you eat and get rest (even if it is a nap).

Check on your neighbors.

Even if phone service is out, sometimes payphones still work. You can dial 0 to get an operator if you have no change.

If you evacuate leave a note inside the door in a clear waterproof container (like a jar) where you went and when and how to be reached. If you decide to go somewhere bring a flashlight, water, any medications you are taking, money and first aid kit.

In high winds it is safer to be indoors. If you must be out, go with someone else in case you are injured by falling debris. Walk in a single file line.

If you see downed wires stay away from them. If there is sparking, popping noises, or the smell of ozone (like after a lightening strike) stay out of any standing water. If you can get to the fuse box, throw the top breaker to turn off the main.

If your roof has been seriously damaged (for example a fallen tree) do not go up there because it could be very unsafe from collapsed electrical wires or more falling debris.

During high-winds stay away from glass windows and stay out of the street (where most debris blows).

If there is a flooding, do not try to drive through deep standing water.

First Aid

If someone is unconscious but not breathing, tilt their head back lightly by putting your hand on their forehead. Look in their mouth for any object blocking their breathing. Pinch their nose and give three short breaths into their mouth. Take a deep breath yourself and continue.

If someone is bleeding a lot apply direct pressure with a bandage, shirt or towel directly on the wound. Hold for at least 60 seconds. Tie the bandage onto the wound putting a bow knot over the wound. Raise the wound, if possible, above the heart to reduce blood loss. If the bandage has been bled through, put another bandage on top of the old one (do NOT remove the bandage). If the bleeding continues put direct pressure back on top of the bandages and hold until bleeding stops.

If glass or any other object is protruding in a person, do NOT remove it. Put pressure around the wound and banadage it as best you can keeping the object from moving too much.

If a person may have a back injury do not move them.

If a person appears to be in shock (confused, cold and clammy, fixed pupils and/or very pale) lay them down. Elevate legs and arms and cover them.

Utilities

If a pipe is broken, turn off the water main. The water main is a gray tear-drop shaped box located in the basement or ground floor on the wall closest to the street. Pull down the lowest lever towards the floor to turn off the main.

If you need to turn off the power go to the basement and look for a fuse box (a gun metal box on the wall). To turn off the main power flip all the switches starting from the top to the left. If there is a lever on the side, pull it down it will turn off all the power.

If you smell gas, leave your house immediately and leave the door open to avoid dangerous gas build up.

Information

National Weather Service SW 162.4 to 162.5 AM 700
Office of Emergency Management AM 750 FM 89.8
Aftershock Community Rescue FM 88.9 SW 440MHz
For emergencies call 911. If you need help and phones are not working put a sign in a street facing window saying “Need 911”
Be careful of rumors and always try to verify with an outside source

You can do it. Connect with your neighbors and work together to provide for your building, block and/or neighborhood. Your best asset is your mind. If you are stressed take a few seconds and breath before doing anything.

What To Expect

A hurricane comes in 5 different types ranging in severity from the least severe to the most severe. Government agencies determine severity simply by measuring wind speed and tidal influence (not rain or lightening). Currently Irene will probably be a Level 1 when it hits NYC based on the official definition. Hurricanes are strange in that they can increase or decrease rapidly in strength. Katrina was expected to be a Level 2-3 and ended up being a level 5 within a few hours. There are some researchers that believe the level system is not an effective determination of the damage caused by hurricanes.

Here is the official definition of a category 1 from the National Weather Bureau:

CATEGORY 1 HURRICANE:

A tropical storm with winds of 39-73 mph becomes a hurricane when its winds near the center reach 74 mph. The storm surge is generally 4-5 feet above normal. Damage is mostly to trees and shrubbery, with no real building damage. Average wind speed for a cat. 1 is 74-95mph. Minimum central pressure (980 mb.)

What can we expect here in NYC.

The last major hurricane in NYC was in 1985 (Hurricane Gloria). It caused about 385 million dollars in damage in today's dollars. It was mostly high winds and only produced 3.4 inches of rain in the city. The tide was not too high--a little over 6 feet. It produced about 100 injuries and 2 deaths. Gloria was an easier ride because of the low tide, small amount of rain, and to its fast moving nature. We are expecting about 12-16 inches rain from Hurricane Irene. The sewers and water processing plants routinely shut down with 6 inches. We can expect interruptions in both water service and electricity. It could be until mid-morning Monday before any public transportation will be running including Access-A-Ride. Some bridges will be closed for certain periods of time, with late Saturday and Sunday morning being the most likely times. Hospitals will have limited capabilities but seem somewhat prepared to handle an increase of about 15% with no real delays. Flood Zone A has received the first mandatory Hurricane Evacuation in NYC history. The bridges to the Rockaways will be shut down. In evacuation zones one should not expect to receive city emergency services.

AFTERSHOCK ACTION ALLIANCE

It Will Take a lot more than Gardens to solve the Food Crisis

2008-06-14T10:24:00.002-04:00

Here is an interesting article from Common Dreams. The writer has been at the forefront of a number of urban/suburban gardening efforts. He misses the point and seems fixated on the role grain plays in the diet but the comments after the article address this. It is still worth reading especially with the growing world-wide food crisis.

http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/05/30/9301/

UN says Avian Flu still a Threat

2008-05-08T18:37:00.002-04:00

In a recent report (March 2007) the UN says that the Avian Flu is still a threat (specifically in countries like Nigeria, Indonesia and Bangladesh) but there has been some progress over the 10 years. http://www.terradaily.com/reports/UN_Says_Bird_Flu_Still_A_Threat_999.html What the article doesn't

say is the number of researchers and the amount anti-flu vaccinations for humans have

both dropped sharply world-wide. IF the virus mutates to be transmitted from person

to person (which it has not yet only bird to bird & bird to human) we would be less

prepared in some areas than we were a year ago. The good news is that there is a better

understanding world-wide of the threat and cases are more likely to be reported.

NYC Hurrican Evacuation Plan- All Wet

2008-05-07T19:42:00.002-04:00

This is the front page article in todays NYC Metro newspaper about the absurd NYC OEM evacuation plan for New York. (http://ny.metro.us/metro/local/article/Citys_hurricane_plan_Floodprone_subway/12424.html)

It is a pretty critical article of the city's plan to use the subway to evacuate the city if a hurricane is coming. The article points out that last August 2.7 inches of rain swamped the subway reducing service by 50% for over 29 hours. The article also points out that even with 1 1/2 inches of rain in one hour will "seriously effect service on almost all non-elevated lines" due to the need to constantly pump out water. What it doesn't mention is that currently according to the ever optimistic MTA the subway system is already running at 70% capacity during normal hours and 99% during the five "rush hours". So even if there was no rain, it would be impossible for the subways to evacuate everyone. They miss that people evacuating would be loaded down with baggage, even if everyone limited themselves to teh basics. That would also assume that every MTA worker would remain behind to run the trains and the system. It also misses the point for an evacuation to be efficient people would have to be heading to a location where they could get off the Island, probably Port Authority, Grand Central and a few inter-city transit hubs. Thus certain train routes would even be fuller than during rush hour, where people are moving in a more decentralized way. The bus system is even more strapped running at higher capacities and would have to deal with added traffic of those wishing to flee above ground. The list goes on and on about the impracticality of this "plan" which is really no plan. The article also fails to point out that three independent government bodies including the NY Legislature all have pointed out the infeasability of this plan, which by the way cost the tax payers about 2 million to draw up. This should not surprise any readers of this blog, other than it made it on the front page of a local paper.

Interesting Blog

2008-05-04T12:31:00.001-04:00

Here is a link to a woman working on a lefty blog about post-cataclysm technology and preparedness. She is writing one preparedness tip per week for a year, trying to get people ready. It is clever and funny but has some good practical advice also. Check it out:

http://blog52.wordpress.com/

Midwest Earthquakes Poorly Understood

2008-04-19T10:01:00.002-04:00

Read this article about midwest earthquakes and how they may end up doing some real damage from atlanta to Minneapolis.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080419/ap_on_re_us/midwest_earthquake

World Disasters Report 2007

2008-04-16T19:15:00.003-04:00

The International Red Cross annual report in on-line. It is interesting that it is subtitled, Focus on Discrimination

http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/disasters/wdr2007/WDR2007-English.pdf

Scientist: CDC Bosses Ignored Warning

2008-04-02T19:33:00.000-04:00

A federal scientist said Tuesday his bosses ignored
pleas
to alert Gulf Coast hurricane victims earlier about severe health risks
from
formaldehyde in government-issued trailers and once told him not to
write
e-mails about his concerns.

read the entire AP article: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080401/ap_on_go_ot/fema_trailers_cdc

Top 10 disaster Myths

2008-03-30T19:06:00.000-04:00

Top 10 Myths about Disasters

by aftershock action alliance

The Government Emergency Managers Primary Interest is Protecting you and your loved Ones?

This is one of the most common myths about disasters. FEMA, OEM, and EAS are not about protecting human lives but about maintaining control. In Katrina they did not allow the helicopter pilots fly to rescue survivors because they had not sufficient “control of New Orleans” but did drop use helicopters to drop Navy SEALs in to protect valuable warehouses and the district branch of the Federal Reserve. All disaster research agrees the most casualties occur within the first 24 hours of a disaster, the government themselves they do not plan to “intervene” during major crises for at least 36 hours. There first interest is in controlling populations and maintaining COG (continuance of government), which they actually say publicly on their web-sites and publications. Property and government infrastructure come before you, your friends and your loved ones as priorities for all levels of government emergency managers.

Emergency Workers are your first line of aid during a disaster?

The truth is that 90% of those rescued during a disaster are rescued by civilians. This number has remained relatively unchanged for 50 years, despite the growing budgets and technological sophistication of first responders. Even search and rescue is dominated by civilian volunteers with no training. Your co-workers, neighbors, family and friends are the people most likely to provide meaningful aid and relief during a disaster.

People will panic or act selfishly during an emergency?

We have all seen movies about disasters where people panic or act in their own self-interests (at the detriment of those around them) during a disaster. The research from various disaster centers who have analyzed thousands of case studies from across the globe and going back 65 years, suggest that it is exceptionally rare that people panic. People do panic in specific situations like airports, hospitals, schools and stadiums where they are surrounded by strangers in a a total environment. Even in these situations it only occurs about a ¼ of the time. There are almost not accounts of people panicking in their own neighborhoods or places of work. One only needs to think back to Katrina or 9/11 to see that people make rational decisions even when confronted with massive disasters. Disasters also tend to bring out the best in people. Spontaneous mutual aid is actually more prevalent during times of crisis. People are more willing to help each other out even at risk to themselves. Crime rates actually drop quite low during and following disasters. The press tends to over-emphasize looting but the amount of looting that occurs during a disaster is actually less than the amount of shop-lifting that occurs during a normal day. The looting is also mostly of food and supplies (diapers) that would perish anyways and is often needed by victims of disasters. The supposed crimes (rapes of children) at the Superdome during Katrina all turned out to be false and started actually by the New Orleans Police Chief in a stupid ploy to get more attention, he was fired a few weeks afterward. Despite all the research with disasters and people coming together during times of stress and crisis, the government still refuses to believe the unwashed masses won't panic and are loathe to give real information to the public about a disaster.

Donating money to large and established charities is the best way you can help others during a disaster?

US News and World Report in 12/2006 did exhaustive research on donations for relief following disasters. They found about 10% of all donations actually went to direct relief efforts. The rest of 90% of those charitable donations went to other things. For example in 2005 the head of the Red Cross, Marsha Evans pulled in $651, 957 that year and yet only worked 30 weeks. Other charities are not better. 25% to 50% of all money goes into fund raising and development, that means up to ½ of the money you donate is to get more people to donate. Large amounts of money then are essentially funneled to PR and advertising firms that are there to make a profit.

We are better today at predicting disasters.

According to University of Delaware researchers, the largest disaster center in the world, we are actually no better at predicting disasters then we were in 1984. For nearly the past quarter of a century we have not improved one bit, in predicting when disasters will strike. We are even worse at predicting the effect of disasters. In James Surowiecki's well researched book The Wisdom of Crowds, emergency experts are not even better than public at predicting the damage (property loss and causalities) caused by specific natural disasters. A recent NSA intelligence report suggests we may actually be in a worse position to predict terrorist events then we were 10 years ago. The International Committee on Climate Change, made up leading scientists, suggest “the current climate chaos, throws many of our best predictive models and methodologies into serious doubt about their efficacy”.

Disasters hurt the economy.

There is the wide spread belief that no one wants a disaster because it negatively impacts the economy, but unfortunately like war disasters are situations where corporations can make massive profits. In Naomi Klein's well researched best-seller The Shock Doctrine, she shows that the corporate elite actually counts on disasters for their economic health. Companies like Haliburton, Exxon, GE, Wal-Mart, etc. actually benefit from disasters receiving no-bid sweetheart deals from the government and permanent contracts that siphon off public funds. In on a local level disasters are big profit makers for real estate developers that can get property at subsidized prices, while corporations are given tax breaks for staying in the area or moving into it. In addition, disasters are useful for rolling back labor gains for workers and privatizing public agencies (e.g. Schools and sanitation). While it is true the poor and working class get damaged economically from disasters the rich and corporations can actually get more money. Most shockingly is that according to the Wall Street Journal, disasters actually cause the stock market to rise, disproportionately for the wealthy companies and investors. On a local level property and income taxes almost always rise for poor and working class people with a substantial cut in public services.

There are sufficient medical services available in case of a biological event (pandemics, bio-terrorism, etc.).

There is not enough stockpiled medications for everyone according to a 2005 CDC report. That report in facts throws doubt on that there is even enough medical supplies for first responders (who get priority of course during a disaster). The reason for this dangerous shortfall is that pharmaceutical companies in this country are not required to provide drug supplies to the government at below market price. Norway for example makes all drug companies operating in the country donate (free of charge) enough drugs to cover every person in Norway. These companies are the same but due to lobbyist efforts this is not true in the US, where many of these companies are located. It is not only a matter of drugs, other medical services are precariously low. There are fewer ambulance per capita in the US than in Columbia and 48 other countries. We rank 51^st in emergency room doctors and nurses in the world. Over the past year the government has defunded about 25,000 public hospital beds and the trend seems to continue. Most urban hospitals operate at about 90% capacity (a requirement of most managed care systems) so nearly any disaster will quickly overwhelm these hospitals.

Rural areas are always safer than urban areas during a disaster.

The truth is that rural areas are no safer than urban areas when hit by disasters. Causality rates are slightly higher in rural areas (per capita) than urban areas. The reason for this is the lack of infrastructure in many rural areas, making it easier for people to be cut off for longer periods of time. Rural areas also have a lack of people power, since we know most rescue efforts rely on civilian volunteers, cities have denser populations and thus more people to provide aid.

Disasters are apolitical events.

Nearly all disasters are political events. The causes of disasters from 9/11 to Katrina have political dimensions. Aid and relief efforts have political calculations. Populations with more political clout (e.g. Money) receive more aid and relief. Affluent populations even have their own private relief and aid organizations subsidized by the government. During the recent wildfires in the wealthy white areas of Malibu more firefighters were dispatched than in the more populous areas of poorer valleys struck the same year by wildfires. The wealthy residents had their own private firefighters who literally saved some homes while allowing others to burn. Groups like Helpjet, cater to the rich providing private evacuations to luxury resorts while others wait for bottled water in the Superdome. Our country has moved into a have and have not approach to disaster relief and aid where certain lives and homes are considered more worthy of protection than others. The recovery efforts in devastated areas is also fiercely political. In New Orleans, undamaged public housing was destroyed to make room for new condominiums sold to well-connected developers for 1 cent to the dollar. Charles Scott, one of the top researchers in disaster studies from Stanford University, conducted an 18 year study on insurance and government pay outs for disaster victims concluded, “It is clear that poor people have little reason to hope they will be treated fairly when it comes to disaster recovery. In many ways they are victimized again by the entire process.” Naomi Klein has pointed out in her book and numerous articles and papers that the extreme right-wing has successfully used the “shocks” of disasters to roll back labor laws and civil liberties to further their political agendas.

There is nothing you can do during a disaster.

This is the most destructive of all the disaster myths. There is so much you can do when joined by your friends, co-workers and neighbors. We know that civilian volunteers providing mutual aid is the most effective form of both direct relief and recovery and thus there is much you can do to mitigate the most devastating effects of a disaster. You must prepare and be ready to act with your community to protect itself both from the disaster and the political elements that would exploit the situation. You can find help on how to prepare and organize for disasters at www.aftershockaction.org

How Individuals and Groups React During Disasters

2008-03-23T10:04:00.003-04:00

An excellent article from the University of Delaware's Disaster Research Center. It covers many interesting aspects about why decision making should be decentralized and busts the common disaster myths of how ordinary people will react in times of crisis.

http://www.udel.edu/DRC/preliminary/138.pdf

Crowd In Control --new article

2008-03-22T22:02:00.001-04:00

Crowd In Control: Decision-Making During Disasters

Information dissemination/control and decision-making are two primary and interrelated activities any response must confront during a disaster. How information is shared/managed and decisions are made will shape every other aspect of relief and recovery. These important areas must be decided upon before a disaster if a team or organization is going to be able to respond effectively to the many unknowables during a crisis. The Aftershock Action Alliance model uses a decentralized and autonomous approach to both information and decisions which is at odds with most Government and Private emergency management plans. We believe that there are very good reasons for bucking the trend of centralization and information control which will in turn lead to a more effective relief/recovery effort and promote community empowerment and active resistance.

Information is a key component of decision-making and in fact is nearly impossible to imagine action without some information. There are a number of theories around how information is gathered, disseminated and analyzed. We will not go into the theories of what information is but accept the etymology of the word, “to give form” to something. Information allows us to form in our mind what something is. For a disaster there can be many types of information but one thing is clear that there is often only incomplete idea what is actually happening. This is a result of many factors like the surprise and speed of a disaster and its interruption of normal flows of information (e.g. knocking out phone lines). Disasters are not information free zones but the context of events is often disrupted to such an extent to make comprehension difficult. For example, the power may go out in our home and we look out and the street is black. We do not know if the entire city, county or state is without power. We may also not know what caused the power outage or how long it will be out. The normal attempts to seek information may be thwarted by not having access to phones, Internet, television or radio. We must decide “what is happening”, form the context for us to decide what action is to follow. If it is a blown fuse then we will search out our circuit box in the basement, if the state is blacked out then going to the fuse box is foolish.

Obviously the more correct information we have the better we will be able to decide and plan action that is sync with the events. If we have little contextual information or our information is in error our decisions and thus action will be severely impaired. That is why every organization dedicated to responding to disasters puts such a premium on information collection and management. In this way Aftershock is no different than government agencies or NGO's. Where we differ from these other organizations is in our belief in the old computer hacker motto, “Information wants to be Free”.

Government/NGO organizations spend thousands of dollars to create encrypted and scrambled communication devices so their communications (and thus information) can be private. They also use a variety of scientific and military jargon, code and abbreviations to make their communications unintelligible for the average person. What is telling is the Emergency Alert Service's (what used to be the buzzing EBS) own guidelines never mention providing “information” to the general public but only “instructions”. The motivations (and thus the information they are based on) for these instructions are kept secret from the public. This is the position of the most “public” of the emergency management agencies. The government and most private relief agencies believe that the public can not understand the information coming in and out of disaster areas. One would assume this is based on some sort of research but this isn't the case. Even a cursory glance at research from sociology, psychology and even disaster studies demonstrates that ordinary citizens can assimilate vast amounts of data and “give form to” reasonable scenarios based on what they've learned. One study done by the Santa Fe Institute, gave information about a group of tornadoes that hit Kansas in 1962, to a group of ten emergency managers and ten civilian survivors of tornadoes from New Mexico. They found that on 7 factors (e.g. Estimated number of causalities) both groups did similarly. In fact the ten civilians had greater agreement internally then the “experts”. So why won't the government give the public information it needs? One rationale for withholding information from the public is the great fear of “mass panic”. As we have written elsewhere this is mostly a myth and there is over 20 years of research to back us up. In the rare occasions that panic does occur it generally is in very specific situations. These situations are characterized by lack of familiarity with the environment, over-crowding, lack of access to the normal social networks and expert over-reaction. Even under some of these situations, panics do not occur. It seems the fear of panic is wholly over-blown and not a good excuse for withholding information from the public. Controlling information does allow organizations to exert control over groups that do not have access to information. Psychology experiments have suggested that people over-estimate the value of secret of information. For example, a psychology experiment at the University of Wisconsin in 1999, allowed long-time gamblers to peak at the one card at anytime during a standard five card draw poker game. Those that peaked, bet more even if they had a loosing hand and those that were not allowed to peak bet less even if they had a good hand. The effect on the poker game was large despite the little statistical significance of looking at one random card. What this showed is that people who get secret information, even when it is not important, will over estimate the value of that information and so will everyone else even if they have no idea what that information is and whether it will be useful for their actions. So you can see how the fact that the government has access to information the rest of us don't have allows them to exert a greater control over our actions regardless of the usefulness of that information. This approach also breeds a foolish arrogance in the part of those in possession of such supposed knowledge. This is probably the real reason governments spend so much time and resources “protecting” the public from panic by withholding important information.

Aftershock believes information should be shared and be public. We are dedicated to finding ways of getting information to the public so people can better form an opinion on what is going on. Understanding that there are many unknowns during a disaster and that normal communications systems will undoubtedly be impaired, Aftershock relies on the “many eyes, big voice” model of information sharing. Aftershock believes that people are reasonably capable of providing useful information about the key issues regarding a disaster. This of course goes against popular thought about the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. Eyewitness reliability has been questioned in courts and in classroom experiments for decades. The assumption is that people make very poor judges of actual facts and misinterpret and add to things they witness. While that is true, it is not the whole truth. Witnesses are very good at recalling and explaining certain facts (e.g. gender) and poor at others (e.g. Colors), it depends on what they are experiencing. Groups tend to increase the accuracy of eye-witness testimonies. Research suggests that 4 people witnessing a car accident can get over 90% of the “relevant” details correctly. The question is whether eye witness information about disasters is any better or worse than in car crashes. We do not know the answer and as far as we can tell there is no reliable research on that question. What we do know is that the more eyes you have, the more likely you will get accurate information. In_____ influential work The Wisdom of Crowds he shows that over a 140 years of research in biology, sociology, psychology and information systems suggest that larger groups of people can make better decisions and accumulate more useful and accurate information than smaller cadres of experts. There is some precedents for this in our experiences. At mass mobilizations decentralized information gathering systems like Indymedia website¹ are superior (in terms of speed and accuracy) in relaying crucial information like arrests and injuries when compared to official government agencies (e.g. the police department) or corporate media (e.g. Local news). During Katrina amateur radio buffs provided a better description of the damaged areas and the type of flooding in New Orleans than FEMA or any other organization. Aftershock seeks to maximize the number of people that can participate in the information sharing during an emergency. The larger number of reporters or collectors of data ensure that widely inaccurate information is weeded out. Wikipedia according to a Nature article (December 2005) is as accurate as the Encyclopedia Britanica when experts compared randomly selected articles. We are confident that the information collected by a multitude will be accurate and useful if we can get enough people to share information. The question is how during a disaster do we allow regular people to share the information they have. Aftershock is working on a number of decentralized models in which people can bring information and report what is going on, even when communication disruptions and other obstacles are in place. We are all familiar with the “telephone game”, where information is passed on from one person down a chain and by the end the it is completely changed. This demonstrates the inherent problem of second-hand sources, which the Government, media and NGOs almost entirely rely on for their data. We want to allow individuals that have first hand information to be able to share it, like wikipedia and indymedia, in an uncensored way. We believe that if there is substantial first-hand information available, the need to use possibly inaccurate second-hand sources will be greatly diminished. This will also allow the most up-to-date information since it will not have to be managed before being released. We all know that during a crisis timely information is crucial.

Being able to accurately provide first-hand information to the public will require a big and simple voice. That means, we have to come up with ways to take decentralized reports and expand their reach as quickly as possible. Broadcast radio seems ideal for this type of timely dissemination. Relatively simple technology would allow an am/fm or shortwave broadcast to reach a large number of people spread out geographically. Radio technology is relatively efficient and the power requirement would be minimal and could be kept operational with a generator or alternative energy resources. Radio has the advantage of allowing anyone with a radio or within hearing distance of a radio to obtain information simultaneously. A crisis center, or any other meeting place, could with one battery/crank/solar radio provide information to hundreds of people at once without using precious resources or labor. To collect information the use of small digital recorders and other devices could reduce the time of writing or reproducing information and could easily and quickly be disseminated by a transmitter. Radio broadcasts also allow people to obtain information while doing other things (e.g. first aid), requiring no focal point and minimal attention drain. It also allows people to take their information, if they have a radio, and be mobile with it. To be truly useful, the information will need to be in languages used by the folks in the area. First hand accounts, will aid this by allowing participation by various segments of the population. It also makes literacy a non-issue. Psychologists have done studies on freshman students (one might assume they are a bit more literate than some general populations) and found they can retain 50% more information from audio resources than written resources in the same amount of time. This maximizing of information load could be crucial for people during a crisis and involved in decision-making.

We all know that government agencies and relief organizations use a top down decision model , often called a command & control model. The problems with this model should be obvious to anyone who studies disasters. C&C models tend to be slow reacting, when time is of the essence, and often lack appropriate flexibility. Flexibility is key when dealing with disasters because of the large amount of unknowables. C&C models do not promote individual and/or small group initiative. They put a primacy on analysis over on-the-ground knowledge. C&C models are much better at reacting to predictable events where people have been trained for specialized actions. Much more could be said about the problems of C&C models (e.g. overlapping authority) and management systems in general. For more information on the problems of C&C models see our other article (___________).

Aftershock believes in a participatory and horizontal (P&H) model. The P&H model allows as many people as possible to participate in decision-making. Participation is useful during disasters because all researchers agree that being actively involved in decision making can actually reduce the harmful psychological effects of emergencies on ordinary people. This beneficial psychological effect is not the only reason to use a participatory model. As _____ pointed out crowds are often smarter than the smartest person/people in them. Crows have an eerie ability to know more than the individuals that make it up. This has to do with the aggregation of information and the ingrained desire for mutual aid/cooperation. Since all the participants are deeply invested in coming up with the best solution to their own problems they will minimize damaging decisions and maximize decisions that can aid them in reaching their goals. Recent research in self-organizing models suggest an emergence (moving from simple to complex) occurs when certain principles are met. These crucial principles are: feedback, size and egalitarian power-sharing. Feedback and size are related, if the size of a group gets too big feedback systems are less effective. Research shows that humans can reasonably “read” others in groups of about 60 and when groups get bigger the feedback system breaks down. When feedback is no longer working all sorts of negative characteristics manifest: aggression, suspicion, gossip, isolation and so on. Size also effects how coordinated a group can be. One can think of a flock of geese, they can engage in complicated aerial maneuvers in flocks of about 20 but bats can coordinate their actions in the thousands. If you double the size of a flock (geese or bats) their coordination drops substantially and they will almost invariably break into smaller groups.

The P&H model must allow for groups that get too big to break into smaller groups so that the feedback system and coordination can continue. Flocks, herds, ant hill, bee hives and so on show that key to maintaining complex behavior (and high degrees of coordination) is egalitarian power sharing. While it is true many social animals, wolves and baboons, exist in rigid hierarchies, their ability to be flexible is seriously compromised. Biologists have noted that in times of environmental changes wolf packs and baboon troops actually become less hierarchical. This probably serves a variety of reasons that allow these groups to maximize their adaptability.

Egalitarian groups are more adaptable because they can break up and reform. One can think of a flock of birds when attacked by a predator like a hawk. The hawk will swoop in and the flock disbands and then quickly reforms, over and over again. This both tires and confuses the hawk and minimizes the damage it can do to the flock as a whole and increases the survivability of each individual. The fact that any faction has the same ability to decide how and when to reform with the other splinter groups allows it to be very adaptive. This also plays out during disasters. There is a myth that disasters are just emergencies writ large. Some disaster experts, like NYPD chief Kelly, believe disasters are “like huge car accidents”. They believe that disasters are simply a matter of scale not quality and this can be a costly mistake (though common of C&C models). Hierarchical groups, with power concentrated in a minority of individuals, allow for greater disruptions. What C&C models often don't take in account is disruption among their own system. If 10% of professional emergency responders can not get to the disaster site or report to duty how will that effect the chain of command. The loss of an individual or a group of individuals is not evenly distributed among the whole and thus can have devastating effects at both end s of the chain. There is the problem of decapitation of course, when the leadership is unable to communicate its commands to the subordinates but equally problematic is when subordinates are not around to carry out the tasks of commanders. During Katrina and 9/11 we saw this play out with devastating effect. In 9/11 the Office of Emergency Management was in the World Trade Center and thus commanders could not get together and send out commands. In Katrina over 50% of patrolmen did not report to duty so commands went unheeded. Sharing power, like sharing information, allows for more balanced decisions to emerge. Extreme errors in judgment can be checked if there is a horizontal structure that might be missed with a few commanders calling the shots. Sharing power allows actions to be more timely since the center of decision making is with the group. In C&C models groups must await orders before acting even if they know what to do, this delay can be catastrophic (eg helicopters being grounded during Katrina). Sharing power also increases investment in the decision, creating greater cohesion and coordination. When people are not invested in a decision other influences must be brought to bare to ensure compliance like training, retribution and reward. These types of influences may be difficult to muster during a disaster especially if it is wide spread and unpredicted. People who feel invested in the decision will more likely go out of their way to ensure its success even at sacrifice to their own immediate needs or concerns. We believe consensus is probably the best way to ensure maximum input, participation and investment in the decision making process. Many believe that consensus is not effective is large and diverse groups but research doesn't support this proposition. Experiments conducted at Stanford suggest that diversity has little impact on a groups ability to reach consensus regarding concrete goal-directed actions. Groups of students were divided in two groups after taking a battery of personality tests and surveys. Group A was made up of people with similar profiles while Group B was purposefully made up with people to maximize diversity. Each group had to use consensus to work their way through a digital maze in a certain period of time, if they succeeded they receive a monetary reward. While both groups were able to succeeded at the task, Group B out performed Group A every time in terms of speed and accuracy (while reporting it a more difficult experience). So consensus may be filled with arguing and frustration it doesn't seem to negatively impact the actual decisions being made. Another common criticism is that consensus takes too long. While it is true that a dictatorship is the most efficient decision making in regards to time (assuming the dictator has an efficient way to disseminate their commands) most other decision models are not significantly faster than consensus. According to the same Stanford researchers voting takes about 80% of the time as consensus, when they added a majority voting system to the groups. When there is significant time pressure consensus groups can make decisions in a reasonable amount of time. The subjective experience of time is very different between voting and consensus. The Stanford researchers found that the voting groups could accurately assess the amount of time their decisions took, while the consensus groups invariably believed their overestimated the time it took to make decisions. This may be the result of the reported frustration of consensus building. This will be a stumbling block for the P&H model in that many people will at first be resistant to consensus (despite its practical benefits) and exposure to the process will not necessarily engender satisfaction with this mode of making decisions. We believe this problem does not outweigh the benefits and we will need to do more research and thinking about how to reduce the frustration with consensus decision making.

The P&H model also has the added benefit of best utilizing the skills and knowledge of an ad hoc group. It is difficult for C&C groups to effectively gage and utilize the abilities of volunteers and thus prefer to use only known subordinates (trained professionals). That is why there is so little effective inter-agency cooperation between both government agencies and NGO relief groups. By creating and utilizing an open P&H model individuals can more easily share their abilities with the group. A decentralized system allows for greater and more timely feedback loops to allow groups to adjust to their strengths and weaknesses. This can be crucial in the ever shifting landscape of a disaster. Individuals in a group can quickly replace someone who is not able to do the job and switch roles more fluidly than in a C&C system that doesn't allow for such transitions.

Additionally, the Aftershock model allows for greater community empowerment. People who have the experience of direct decision making during a crisis are less likely to abdicate that collective power to authorities. Joint decision making also creates important social bonds between individuals and groups that can be used to network knowledge and resources inside the community. We believe by supporting and participating in community self organization efforts we can foster greater possibilities of active resistance. Active resistance can take the part of protecting a community from destructive and exploitive recovery schemes and/or be used to challenge generalizable oppression. A successful community response to disasters can be a powerful tool in creating greater autonomy and strengthening the interconnectedness of dependent and fractured neighborhoods.

1Indymedia is made up of non-specialists who run a web-site where anyone can post information about a protest.

Pedal Power Resources

2008-03-13T23:13:00.001-04:00

here is a pretty good list of innovative pedal power resources and how to'd.

Pedal Power Resources  Juicycle <http://juicycle.com/> Homebuilt pedaled kitchen accessories toolset constructed with common  fasteners; metal welding avoided. Plans and anecdotes provided. Lightfoot Cycles <http://www.lightfootcycles.com/> We design and build dynamic, evolving and improving human-powered  vehicles. Maya Pedal <http://www.mayapedal.org/> We recycle used bicycles to build pedal-powered machines which support  and help facilitate the work of small-scale, self-sustainable projects. Pedal Power Directory <http://www.energyplanet.info/Pedal_Power/> Web directory of information about pedal power, pedal powered  generators  and transportation. Pedal Works <http://pedalpower.org/> Pedal energy development alternatives develops and promotes the use of  pedal powered technology. The Bicycle Tutor <http://bicycletutor.com/> Video tutorials show you how to repair your own bike! Wikipedia: Pedal Powered Vehicle  <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedal_powered_vehicle> Pedal powered vehicle is used to describe several types of vehicles.

Free On-Line Biological/Chemical Terrorism book

2008-03-12T21:47:00.001-04:00

this is a book but out by gov't folks but has some useful emergency preparedness info in it.

http://www.nap.edu/html/terrorism/index.html

Decontamination Infosheet by Aftershock

2008-03-12T21:46:00.001-04:00

Biological, Chemicle & Radiological Decontamination

Decontamination is defined as the process of removing or neutralizing a hazard from the environment, property, or life form. The principal objectives of this process are to prevent further harm and optimize the chance for full clinical recovery or restoration of the object exposed to the dangerous hazard. Military and civilian research suggests that upwards to 97% of dangerous contaminants can be removed through simple decontamination procedures for both ambulatory and non-ambulatory victims. Medical triage should occur first and then decontamination. There are two types of decontamination procedures: Site and Field. Site decontamination is what is done on the location where victims are first encountered. This could be indoors or outdoors and should be treated accordingly. Field is a area set up at a Crisis Center, where other supplies and more fixed infrastructure is.

SITE

Decontamination Procedures:

Always ensure your own health, do not engage in activities that will put you at undue risk.
Decontamination always occur after the 30 second standard Medical triage.
Prioritize non-ambulatory victims first
Keep ambulatory victims from moving around and spreading or “embedding' contaminates
Move all patients, if feasible, from contaminated sites and barring this find reasonable shelter to resist further or re-contamination.
Remove patients clothes (with medic shears). Estimates suggest 70% of decontaminates are on clothes (and approx.25% of them will transfer in time to the body).
Perform a quick 1 minute rinse staring from head and going to feet (there are more orifices and larger pores in the top part of the body). You will need about 2 gallons of water
If there is time rinse again with a dilution of some cleaning agent (e.g. Soap). The idea is the added molecular weight and possible chemical adhesion will occur and remove more contaminants. You will need about 2 gallons of water and a 1/100 part solution to maximize resources and effectiveness.
Re-cloth the body (obviously not with the old soiled clothes). The easiest and best way to do this is with garbage bags. The plastic allows for an effective barrier and is somewhat resistant to “contaminant travel” due to its non-porous nature. The uniformity in color also helps spot decontaminates. One could also use emergency blankets to meet the same need.
Soiled clothes should be bagged and sealed if possible or lumped together. A note saying “HAZ/MAT” is enough to alert others not to touch or go near it.
Shears should be rinsed before returning to your bag and gloves, face masks and or other personal emergency protection should be left in the HAZ/MAT bag or pile.

Field

Decontamination Procedures:

You should set up at least two field decontamination sites. One for each Gender.
To avoid trouble or slowing down, try to ensure at least some privacy, a complete tent like structure is optimal .
The structure should have a clearly marked entrance and exit.
Containers with lids or bags, should be provided for people to discard their clothes, while they wait in line.
On the other side of the path 9across from the dumping ground) should be new clothes, robes, towels, or something. It should be very close so people can get it at the same time they are dropping of contaminated clothes.
Hoses or buckets attached to pulleys or rigged in some other way above the people should be available.
People will move ideally through three connected sections of the tent.
First will have a lot of water 3-4 gallons or 30 seconds of 15 psi hose (about the strength of a garden hose).
Stage 2 will have the cleaning solution and half the water of stage 1 (scale the above step)
Stage 3 will have the same amount of water as the previous stage but no cleaning solution.
There will be another receptacle for the newly contaminated cloth and new coverings.
The exit path should veer off immediately to the left or right as close to a 90 degree angle as possible...to avoid contaminating mist, ensure greater privacy and to avoid congestion.
There should be clear directions to the medical triage station and all people should head that way.

Non-Ambulatory Patients in a Field Contamination Station

For the most part follow the same procedure as above
Non-ambulatory people should go first
There should be a throw away on the stretcher being used (if you have no material for throw-aways then wash it down with a gallon of 1/50 solution and have at least 3 alternating stretchers)
Do NOT flip the patient (this could cause greater injury than the contamination)
Rescuers escorting the stretcher should be wearing maximum personal protection gear and that gear should be disposed of AFTER all escorting is done.
Having a roller system or stretchers on ropes, is the best way to avoid escort contamination

Other Notes about Decontamination:

If You Do Not Have Water: Follow the procedures but use sand, flour, talc powder or similar substance. Then use a soft broom to brush it off.
What about Babies & Infants They must always be escorted and one must make sure to protect them from inhaling water. One can use less water on children and babies.
What about water Run Off the research seems to suggest that for most decontaminates it is not that big of a deal. You will need to have some pallets or what not if there are many, because it will get muddy. I think for us it would be ideal to collect the water, to keep it seeping into the soil or entering the sewer.
Escorts should go through Decontamination escorts even with full protective gear should still go through decontamination after their shift is done.
How about bleach never use bleach with chemical or radiological decontamination, it can make it worse. Bleach must be administered very carefully and should only be used by ambulatory patients and in very diluted amounts (½ cap-full per gallon)
Cleaning tools To save time and avoid mistakes, all possibly contaminated tools should be put in a container or bag together. Then water with 50% solution should be added to container. Soaked for at least 5 minutes. Dumped out and spread over a piece of plastic,tarp, canvass or on concrete. Then tools should be hosed down and then carefully rotated and hosed again. All tools should be allowed to dry before using again. All tools should be marked with red (tape, spray paint, markers, etc.) and should be considered Hot even after cleaning. They should be kept separate from other tools so there is no mix up.

The need for Volunteers

2008-03-09T19:10:00.002-04:00

Even some in FEMA are saying the reality is they need help to mitigate disasters and promote effective relief efforts (that being said they have done nothing about it).

Excerpts from this week's Time magazine
( http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1717404,00.html )
"Why is this radical? Because even though regular people do the majority of rescuing after almost every major disaster, they are the last people to be intelligently enrolled in the process. Emergency managers and professional responders do not trust the public as much as they should, nor do politicians. 'The first responder community — fire and police — would like you to believe that, without them, you're not going to survive," says Eric Holdeman, who spent 11 years running emergency management operations in Seattle before leaving in 2007. "But the reality is that there are not enough of them to be able to respond to regional, large incidents.'"

"An oil spill in San Francisco Bay leaked 58,000 gallons of black oil into the water, killing at least 400 birds. Without being asked, thousands of locals showed up to help. Fishermen emptied out their boats and put on their gloves; families came with buckets and Kitty Litter spades. "Two thousand people showed up and said, we'll do hazardous waste removal," says Baker. But most of them were chased away. "All these federal and state agencies said, oh no, we don't need volunteers." Buddhist monks were arrested crossing police lines to help clean up the beach."

Law Enforcement actively discouraging Volunteers

2008-03-09T19:08:00.001-04:00

There are a number of videos on youtube, showing various californian Law Enforcement agencies actively discouraging (and in one case arresting some Buddhist monks) volunteers cleaning the beach of spilled oil before it could be washed back out to sea.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FEH6B9xE1dg&feature=related

Sel-Organization -Aftershock Article

2008-03-04T19:16:00.000-05:00

Self Organization During Disasters

“Self organization depends upon ready access to timely, accurate information through an information infrastructure that supports systematic monitoring of critical conditions, feedback to responsible participants, and revision of actions taken in the light of new information. When this is in place, no other emergency management is as successful.” -- Comfort (1995) based on his research of the Great Hanshin Earthquake Japan 1995

Since at least World War II researchers have known that emergencies of all types could be best mitigated by “civilian resources” when available. Self Organization is the key to this remarkable success in civilian response to a wide range of emergencies and have proved effective in many socio-geographic environments around the world. Despite this decades old knowledge, and proven success record, governments, NGOs and corporate elites have continued to foist bureaucratic, centralized and dangerous management schemes on communities around the globe. Aftreshock Action has studied and looked at what makes self-organization such an effective tool in relief and recovery work and what elements support or hamper successful community responses to crises. This article looks at some of the most recent research and points us in ways in which we can optimize our community's ability to self-organize during a disaster.

Though governments, NGOs and corporations are constantly revising and re-branding their emergency efforts, the model they employ remains surprisingly stable. Social science researchers have dubbed their management efforts “command and control systems” as opposed to “community response systems”. These models are often employed together when dealing with an emergency/disaster. Due to the inherent flexibility and quick reactive time community response nearly always occur prior to command/control systems. Sometimes they operate together in geography but almost always remain separate due to the inherent contradictions embedded in each approach. Command/control approaches believe by their own internal logic that they need to eventually dismantle the community response to be effective. So in the end one model usually trumps the others during different periods of a crisis and its aftermath. Both models need to provide some basic functions: evaluation/information; resource management; react/adapt to unpredictable variables; develop and implement decisions; obtain consent of victims, stake-holders and the “public”. Each model based on its organizational principles approaches these functions from very different perspectives.

Control/command systems are characterized by closed information feedback systems. Information is controlled and managed by gate-keepers (e.g.”experts”). This system can often become very fragile and overwhelmed during a disaster by the duality of too much data and ever increasing number of variables. These two problems are exacerbated by the attempt by command/control systems to work from a gestalt (wide angle approach) and the need to manage and feed information to those in a position to analyze it. Obviously these groups know that disasters often compromise information management by damaging infrastructure and rapid changes. To get around these problems they put a lot of stock in predictive models in an attempt to create plans prior to the event. They also seek technology that can provide secure and uninterrupted transmission of data and other information to gatekeepers. Because the loop is closed and in many ways predetermined, there is a heavy emphasis on “scenarios” and “action models”. The closed loop has failed so spectacularly in the past. Control/command models believe that the problem has been a lack of data and information so there has been a greater and greater emphasis on data collection. Soon there was a problem, the amount data was so large it was impossible even for a team of highly educated and specialized experts to not get overwhelmed. To get over this hurdle, they turned to using massive supercomputers for not only crunching the numbers using statistics but to create computer simulations and action modules. In a sense removing any human oversight in the technologically dependent model. The truth is that this model has done poorly. Researchers who have looked at the computer simulations for disasters have found that nearly 80% of predicted outcomes of disasters have been so far off base as to be almost random (2002 Richardson). In fact, over the past 10 years there has not been one successful simulation system that has been able to predict the accurately the damaging effects of any of the past Simley's 1,000 most destructive natural disasters (a common list used by disaster researchers). What is so shocking is that nearly 35% of those disasters on the list are naturally and fairly frequent reoccurring phenomena. Comfort did research showing nearly a decade of computer simulations (from a variety of Government and academic sources) to disaster experts. They were given 100 action plans and damage results devised for 200 actual disasters. The experts then had to assign the simulation to the actual disaster, and they could not do it. It was nearly random and the experts had no agreement among themselves.

Community response systems do not normally employed super specialists or chugging super-computers to access and use information from disasters. They employ an open feedback loop that is in real-time. This allows groups to process a smaller amount and scene specific information that they as humans can actually understand and use to formulate action responses. The results of the responses can be evaluated and modified in real time, allowing for a reinforced open feedback loop. These systems [inquiry] allow communities to create innovative and effective solutions to problems of resource allocation that are not available to command and control systems. They also increase the amount of “investment” by communities to self-regulate successful strategies during time of crisis by allowing them access to the information the information they need to formulate and execute plans(Tierney and Trainor 2004). Each community can seek out the information that is most needed at the moment, because the occupy the area of action and must confront the situations there. This limits the amount of variables not just the data and allows for effective information control without the need of sophisticated predictive technology or a cadre of highly trained specialists needed to “understand” the entirety of the situation. Because the open feedback loop is natural occurring, there will be information gathering and analysis happening where ever there is a crisis and a community. So the entirety of a crisis can be analyzed but not by anyone group or model so in a sense a real gestalt is created organically.

These differing approaches towards information management have a direct impact of resource allocation.

Command/control systems have a notorious record of resource mismanagement during an emergency that can actually increase the negative effects of a crisis. Resources in this system are employed based on a statistical models derived from their information systems. This creates an almost universal delay effect in moving resources to an afflicted area since information needs to be vetted and analyzed in a closed loop system. The delay can be quite substantial and when combined with the reality that the necessity of resources in the first few hours are exponentially more useful. The delay in resources are bad enough but the actual deployment of resources (even when they are manipulated by disaster-capitalist interests) has too often been a dismal failure. For example, during 9/11 it was decided to send 40% of the FDNY paramedic units and 75% of the trauma doctors to/near WTC. While Red Cross moved nearly 5 tons of plasma from regional areas as far away as Minnesota to NYC. Of course all of these resources sat unused for up to 30 hours. More people died from lack of emergency services (from non-9/11 related medical emergencies) in a single day than anytime in NYC's history. All that blood that was sent, was rushed here and the paperwork got messed up so NYC had nearly 1000% more blood than normal and with no way to send it back to where it was needed. Most of it had to be thrown away because their was no place to store it, while earnest volunteers still lined Times Square to give even more unneeded blood. FEMA sent nearly a dozen trucks of medical supplies (some arriving on 9/14) but no respirators for the responders or residents in and around the World Trade Center. The list goes on and on. Even during “slow” disasters like famines in Africa we see the same mismanagement of resources that could be used elsewhere. Angry citizens tend to blame incompetence of emergency managers but the history is too long and constant to suggest simply idiots are at the helm of emergency management agencies and organizations. It seems to be more systematic, a result of a faulty model.

Fortunately community response model has a better history of resource allocation. It is shocking the amount of aid that is provided by these unfunded groups. 2002 Walther King looked at local church groups' allocation of resources during Hurricane Lili that hit Louisiana and parts of Texas and did an estimated 860 million dollars damage and left 15 people dead. Local Churches had a budget of .005 of the Office of Emergency Management and fewer staff. They provided nearly three times the injury mitigation and protected more homes and businesses from aftermath destruction than the OEM. They used their limited resources (including human labor) very effectively and wasted almost nothing, where a much better funded agency with hundreds of trained specialists were less effective. Over and over again from earthquakes in Japan, to the Tsunami in South East Asia to tornadoes in Nebraska we see the same pattern. Local groups obviously also have the advantage in response time to disasters of all sorts. There has been extensive research on this topic and the results are conclusive, even the OEM and FEMA admit it in their publications, that community groups respond significantly faster to disaster events (often days before). Even resource poor neighborhoods “can maximize their limited resources if they are employed early, providing a initial intervention that has exponential results in disaster mitigation” (National Research Council- Committee on Disaster Research ).

A key function in emergency response is the ability to adapt/react to changing situations on the ground with imperfect information. Again we find this ability to be severely impaired with the command/control system of crisis management. This impairment is a direct result of the centralization problem inherent in government agencies and NGO organizations. This is similar to the closed information loop, in that, these control/command systems seek to predict and pre-plan the response of its responders. It seeks to substitute on-the-scene decision-making with simulations and regulations. This is undoubtedly also partially a result of the overspecialization of emergency professionals. A simple google search of the types of emergency professionals brings up scores of types, most involving at least 3 years of specialized schooling. Emergency professionals also continuously drill, up to 15 hours a week yet they are incredibly limited in making real decisions in the field. Since they are dependent on the command part of the model they must wait (like resources) for the experts to allocate and plan their actions. During Katrina, dozen of helicopter pilots waited over three days for orders before they could do limited rescue runs despite having the fuel, helicopters, equipment and skills to do it. This is not an aberration but the normal course of events. The reaction time and the adaptation needed to respond effectively to changing situations during a disaster are removed from specialized emergency workers.

The community model draws upon the diverse skills of its members, that almost always lack emergency training. This lack of basic skills (e.g. First Aid) has had a negative impact on the community model but that has not always been the case. During the heyday of Civil Defense (in the 1950's) most Americans had had a basic first aid course. Public schools taught modules on fire suppression, first aid and other useful emergency skills. We know that when emergency skills are disseminated they can be very effective. CPR and the Heimlich maneuver have saved countless lives by employing a community response model. Researchers suggest that nearly 3 times as many victims have been saved by ordinary folks using CPR than all the professionals (doctors, paramedics, life-guards, police, firemen, etc) combined. The community-response model relies on individuals to make decisions and implement action plans based on the vents surrounding them. They have no need for constant drilling or waiting for commands to provide much needed services on the ground. Nearly 1/3 of civilian helicopter pilots (tourist pilots, news helicopter pilots, etc.)during Katrina jumped into action hours after the disaster while better prepared and trained emergency pilots sat waiting for orders. There is more that can be done, we need to provide more basic emergency skills to various parts of our communities to ensure more opportunities for effective action. Despite this obvious weakness there can be no doubt that during an emergency you are more likely to be saved and your home protected by your neighbors than highly trained professionals with high tech gadgets.

All emergency aid efforts are ultimately dependent on complicity and involvement of a variety of groups:victims, stake-holders and the “public”. Even emergency managers understand that the public is an important factor in determining the overall success of a disaster operation. After the dismal failure of FEMA to act during Katrina they sub-contracted with a New York PR firm to “fix” their image and employed their services during the recent California wildfires to some positive effect. The emergency management agency has added “public trust” to its logo, highlighting the role of public opinion on relief efforts. Needless to say trust is not the first word to pop into most Americans' minds when they think of government emergency agencies (NGOs do much better but still need to use slick public relations firms). The above problems with the command/control model undoubtedly play a role in why emergency agencies can not gain the support (or complicity as the social science researchers say)of various segments of the public but the very model of control/command makes this task very difficult.

Command/control models rely heavily on both specialization and centralization that are often at odds with public support. Specialization is by necessity removes itself from the common experience of most people. The knowledge of the specialists is often obscure to everyday educated people, and thus the motivations for their actions often are not understandable to those outside. Centralization also creates decision-makers that are removed both socio-economically and geographically from most of the population and the victims of disasters. A study 2006 by McWilliams, a social psychologist at Harvard,found that among nearly every class (gender, socio-economic, regional, etc.) people tended to trust those they could relate to even if they were more poorly equipped to solve their problems. When people are not invested or do not trust decision makers they tend to unconsciously thwart action plans, a point well understood by emergency managers. Instead of trying to get more people to have trust in their authority (which may not even be possible) they use force and fear to create a passive population. This has negative consequences in that it interferes with their information gathering and fails to utilize the resources, labor and skills of the populations. They give these up in turn for creating passive complicity.

True investment, as demonstrated by the community response model, requires transparent and local decision making processes. It also requires an open information exchange system (not just the choreographed and control management of information so common among bureaucratic agencies and organizations). The fact that the community response approach draws from a shared well of experiences, resources and understandings make their actions and motivations instantly comprehensible at least to the local victims, stakeholders and the regional population. The community response approach often fails to generate large public support due to its regional focus and sphere of influence, the very factors that make it successful on the local level can work against it at larger levels. This problem is somewhat mitigated that most of the community response models resources, actors and interests are local and thus the need to have complicity by an outside generalized public is not as detrimental as it might be for the control/command approach. Activity is probably the easiest and surest way to ensure investment in a given set of actions during an emergency. People that are involved tend to feel more favorable about emergency rescue, relief and recovery efforts than those less involved. The community response model allows a maximum of participation at all stages of disaster relief, thus increasing the likelihood of investment of various populations. Since the communities tend to make decisions along more decentralized and horizontal means, this also promotes a joint sense of ownership of the actions even of groups that one is not directly involved in. For example volunteer fire-fighters and paramedics tend to rate the services of each other much higher than professional co-workers do and in fact there seems to be great distrust among professional departments where competition for budget and resources create toxic work environments (Young, Stanfield, et al 2001).

These two models are so opposite that there is very little reason to try combine these forms. A socio-technological, used by large NGOs and government agencies, approach requires a shift in the conception of response systems as reactive, command and control to ones of inquiry based systems that promote self-organization and self-evaluation. These systems create open feedback systems that do not easily exist in traditional command and control systems. These systems of inquiry allow communities to create innovative and effective solutions to problems of resource allocation that are not available to command and control systems. They also increase the amount of “investment” by communities to self-regulate successful strategies during time of crisis in other words any response to disaster must promote not inhibit emergent structures and activities during disasters.” (Tierney and Trainor 2004). Yet governments and NGOs suggest that disasters be left to professionals with the knowledge, skills and technology to ensure that there is not destructive panic. The control/command model rests on the myth that the public is ill-prepared emotionally and in resources to provide for their own rescue, relief and recovery. They use the boogey-man of panic to suggest that we can not count on our friends, neighbors or co-workers to create viable community responses to emergencies.

Social science research finds little justification that people will respond qualitatively differently to man-made versus natural disasters. The variables that effect response are: Speed of onset; geographical spread; access to information and previous experience or training for disasters. Furthermore all social research from the past 20 years suggest that people do not panic. The population as a whole tends to make very rational choices based on the information and experience they have available. Researchers have looked at variety of cases from the Spanish Influenza, to Chernobyl to 9/11 and find that people respond similarly during a crisis as people say they would react if there was a crisis. So we can predict how people will react to an unpredictable event and they tend to act reasonably. This would suggest that regular citizens can and should be trusted to participate at all levels in their own rescue and recovery operations. Panics do occur and have occurred, but they almost uniformly are located in liminal spaces highlighted by supposedly total environment. There have been recent panics a on cruise ships, airports, stadiums, hospitals and even prisons. One of the reasons for this, is that when authority breaks down AND there is a lack of organic communities people make calculated decisions based on their own awareness and needs. This combined with no reliable sense of information creates panics that can turn deadly.

In the end, it is clear that our survival during an emergency depends on the strength of our local communities. Despite the overwhelming research on this point, NGOs and governments have only allocated token support for local community organizing efforts. This is a great shame because the amount of resources needed to adequately prepare communities is relatively small when compared to the bloated budgets of NGOs and government agencies. Instead of strengthening communities' responses to disasters the government has actually created policies to retard such naturally occurring self-organizing. It would be foolish to look to reform government or NGOs which have committed themselves for decades to a dysfunctional control/command (and profited well on it). We must find ways to support and expand local organizing efforts. The uncanny way a collective community action occurs prior to, during and after a disaster demonstrates the power of organic, and indigenous organizing. These type of communities are not only effective in helping out their neighbors but also revitalizing communities and re-establishing community norms and structures (Drabek 1986). This is the goal of Aftershock Action.

An Article on the Aftershock Model

2008-02-27T19:08:00.001-05:00

Human Resources during an Emergency: The Strength of the Aftershock Model

Disasters are primarily a problem of human resources. The Human Capital model suggests that ordinary people are the important asset of any country. Adam Smith first developed this idea near the end of his life and was later turned and expanded by Karl Marx. Since Marx no less than three economists and one sociologist have won Nobel Prizes using this useful theory. The Human Capital model tends to focus on the productivity or the lack of it and its effect on GNP and other economic indicators and suggest that it is important than technology, land, resources or others in predicting the wealth, diversity and complexity. FEMA, unlike the earlier Civil Defense program, has rejected the Human Capital model (as has the Department of Defense) instead putting their assets on technology, supplies and technocrats. The Aftershock Model is a return to the primacy of average citizens affected by a disaster, looking for ways to maximize people active involvement and problem-solving skills. Emergencies are events that are particularly dependent on human resources in order to avoid unnecessary disaster.

Staffing during a disaster is always full of problems. This shortfall in human resources can dramatically accelerate the negative impacts of an emergency and create a negative feedback loop. Despite decades of independent research and commonsense FEMA and other disaster professionals still seek to limit citizen involvement during crises. This destructive trend has continued in the US with the current budget '08 budget that savaged the only civilian emergency training program by 75% despite record numbers of people signing up for trainings. Institutional NGOs have followed this trend by sinking more and more of their budget into technology and specialists and reducing their budgets for public education. The Red Cross has doubled the resources available to technological budget items while whittling away their public outreach programs by nearly 80%. In the not too distant past 1 out of every 3 “disaster dollars” (money allocated by the Federal Government for emergencies and civil defense) was allocated to local groups and agencies; but today 19 out of 20 “disaster dollars” go to universities, private military contractors and technology corporations. Even the Emergency Broadcasting System (now called Emergency Alert System) has been reduced to about 10% of their budget compared to its height in 1966. All the broadcasters have been removed and it is nearly fully automated now. It went from employing hundreds of various types of workers to a couple dozen technicians. This represents the growing trend to replace human resources with specialists and technology to “manage” disasters. So what is the role of average people during a disaster? It seems clear their model is one of control and management. We have gone from active agents (neighbors helping neighbors) to just another thing that needs to be managed by technology and government specialists.

After a disaster, conventional full-time emergency services are dramatically overloaded, with conventional fire fighting response times often exceeding several days. Staffing levels for hospitals drop up to 70%, with an often dramatic increase in patients thus exacerbating the staff shortage. The emphasis of emergency managers to control, evacuate and contain whole communities has actually reduced effective response to disasters. The International Institute of Disasters Studies published an exhaustive paper comparing mandatory evacuations versus voluntary evacuations in 13 countries. The researchers found that mandatory evacuations actually slowed recovery efforts and perhaps more surprisingly led to more injuries and deaths than voluntary. They also found not surprisingly fewer people left during voluntary (only 22% left compared to 70% for mandatory that was enforced with law enforcement). They concluded this access to “in situ” human resources actually aided rescue and recovery efforts “despite the lack of resources and training”. Removing populations, breaking up communities and hindering self organization are sure recipes in during an emergency into a disaster. This absurd policy has not always been the norm even in this country. It is a recent development, promoted successfully by radical capitalists and rabid authoritarians.

The traditional response to disasters on civilian population centers is to maintain a mass-trained force of volunteer emergency workers. In the 1930's when the Civil Defense was first formed under FDR it had close to 500,000 participants and many more volunteers. The Red Cross and Salvation Army had nearly twice the staff and volunteers as they do today despite 30% of the budget in a adjusted dollars. Studies in World War II showed that lightly trained (40 hours or less) civilians in self-organized teams can perform up to 95% of emergency activities when trained. This was during a time when there was less education and access to resources as today. In this plan, the populace rescues itself from most situations, and prioritizes emergency services.

We can also look at the consolidation and elimination of volunteer fire/ambulance brigades in the rural Midwest. A study done in 1997 by Stokes & Peters Journal of Fire Professionals and Prevention, strongly suggests the consolidation and professionalize of fire departments over three states in the Us Midwest actually reduced services. They looked at injuries, building damage and response times and found the technological sophisticated and better trained fire departments provided a lower quality of service than the volunteer groups. I have heard the same thing said by volunteer paramedic in the Midwest. So why would professional fire departments with more money, better equipment and 20 times the training than volunteers compare so poorly in rural areas of the Midwest? Stokes & Peters put the blame on the lack of human resources. They argue that there were so many more volunteers and more logically distributed (where there were high instances of fires like in grain areas there were more volunteer corps than in less at fire risk areas) than their professional counterparts. One might also suspect that there was an inherent advantage about knowing the localities where they did their fire prevention work and even a greater commitment to helping fellow community members. What Stokes & Peters also found is there was a greater fire awareness in the general population prior to the operationalization of the fire departments makes common sense, since it was a volunteer force it was required to dialog with the community to get volunteers and resources and had an easier time to create effective local outreach and educational programs. The success rates of professional fire departments' educational/outreach programs are dismal despite spending thousands of dollars and engaging professional PR firms.

Another explanation for the success of volunteer, civil and other non-professionalized emergency responders might be that most activities required during a crisis are relatively simple (though essential) to perform. Nearly all emergency literature and research suggests the simple act of turning off utilities after a disaster (e.g. Flood) can reduce fires, injuries and property destruction. Most people can learn to turn off the water-main, gas and electrical power in their home in about 30 minutes of training and with a $3.00 commercial tool. This simple act could reduce the damage of a disaster significantly. All one has to look at it the role CPR has played in saving lives. While it is true forced air bags, new low voltage defibrillators and flexible molded alternative airways are more effective than CPR in saving a patient, there can be no doubt more actual lives have been saved by the simple CPR technique. Nearly ½ of Americans have had a CPR training of some sort or another. While there is no reliable data on how many lives are saved each year (since most CPR incidents are not reported) it is quite common. The majority of CPR classes are taught by community groups with less than 5% being sponsored by NGO's, corporate entities and government agencies. The average cost for a CPOR course is less than $5.00 because most are free. There is no centralized bureau or governing body that is in charge of CPR courses or the technique itself, yet it works. So ordinary people with a little bit of training by community groups and individuals can have a large impact on emergencies. In fact the more people you engage in emergency preparedness the greater success you will have in mitigating the negative effects. If that wasn't enough to suggest a commitment to decentralized community-based emergency preparations there is another good reason to do it. As stated earlier most work during a disaster is common-sense and unskilled with limited need for high tech gadgets. It allows and requires lots of different folks “pitching in”. This pitching in has the added benefit of decreasing the negative psychological impact of disasters on people. All Disaster Psychology textbooks and research acknowledge that meaningful activity offsets many of the detrimental impacts of disasters including the devastating post-traumatic stress disorder. If people feel needed, part of a team and are engaged in tasks they have confidence in, they are less likely to exhibit negative psychological symptoms during and even after a disaster. It is ironic that the emergency managers spend so much time worrying about “mass panic” when the solution is so simple, get people involved, let them be active in aiding their own communities. Research and commonsense suggest that during disasters there is an outpouring of volunteerism. Instead of thwarting this valuable human resource by corralling people and forcing them to be passive consumers of aid, we need to use this powerful force to protect and rebuild our communities.

So why would we move from a human resource and community based model to a less effective and more expensive centralized and technological approach to disaster control? There are two major factors that led to this devastating change: money and power.

The truth is that grassroots community centered relief training is very cheap. It involves average people training their friends, neighbors, families and co-workers and they will often do this for free. Successful civilian relief models are almost inherently low technology and rely on the common and available resources of their area. They are also by necessity open source, meaning they can not be regulated or controlled by corporate interests. There simply is no money to be made out of this type of emergency preparedness. It is not only corporate interests that are effected but also large NGOs that rely on donations and grants to provide relief and rescue efforts (the number one source of such monies from the public & private charitable sectors). There is also increasingly little difference between major international NGOs and international corporations. They often work hand and glove in reaping resources and profits from disasters. The ugly truth is disasters have become major revenue generating for both NGOs and corporations. It is not a surprise that many executive directors of NGOs were once major CEOs in the private sector and that most NGOs contract out equipment and other services to large international corporations. There simply is too much money to be made in disasters and the fear of disasters to support a community based model. The very effectiveness of community based models threaten the privileged position of bloated government agencies, NGOs and corporations.

Money and power always go together. Not only is there large amounts of money to be made from disasters (read the Naomi Klein's exhaustively researched Shock Doctrine for details)but governments, individuals and corporations can use disasters to increase their political power. Disasters engender a great deal of fear, and fear can easily be turned into political capital. Different leaders, corporations and institutions demand our loyalty in exchange for security. We acquiesce to their accumulation of power in exchange for aid. If we could provide for ourselves and our community their control over us would necessarily be limited and we could demand more from them. By pulling us out of our communities and putting us in situations where we can not even provide for our basics turn us into passive children. When armed National Guardsmen control our access to water, we our in a poor position to check abuses of power or even make legitimate demands. When we are dependent on impossibly expensive technologies and arcane expertise we have no choice but to surrender our autonomy to those who claim to protect us from disasters, especially when we have no knowledge on how to do it ourselves. Despite the new model of emergency management is less effective in relief and recovery than community or civilian models, it is more effective in consolidating power and generating huge profits for selected NGOs and corporations.

The Aftershock model, like the earlier civil defense model, attempts to support the creation of self-organized community approaches to emergency preparedness,relief and recovery. Aftershock recognizes the strength and the practicability of creating low-tech grassroots models of emergency management that not only protects our communities but also empowers them. The key difference between the models is Aftershock's reliance on the human capital of community. Even resource poor and politically marginalized communities can create effective emergency groups. Aftershock seeks to disseminate easy and replicatable models (like CPR ) that utilize the resources of the community to create sustainable and community enriching approaches to crises. We understand that NGOs, governmental agencies and corporations have the most too loose from the wide-dissemination of a community based model. We expect resistance from these groups to our efforts and are willing to fight for right to protect and provide mutual aid to our neighborhoods. We know we will need to not only develop alternatives outside the NGO,corporate and government spheres but also be ready to challenge their exploitive and dangerous models. A community-based model that highlights human resource can be a powerful force in not only protecting from the negative impacts of disasters but also in enriching our communities by building confidence and sense of real solidarity.

Canadians can now send the Military in During Civil Emergencies

2008-02-27T19:05:00.000-05:00

North American Army created without OK by Congress
U.S., Canada military ink deal to fight domestic emergencies

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=57228

In a ceremony that received virtually no attention in the American media, the United States and Canada signed a military agreement Feb. 14 allowing the armed forces from one nation to support the armed forces of the other nation during a domestic civil emergency, even one that does not involve a cross-border crisis

Information about Presidential Directive 51

2008-02-10T15:17:00.000-05:00

Here is the best postings I have found about the Presidential Directive 51 which deals with Continuance of Government and related effects that went into effect in 2007.

http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread283240/pg1

learn, organize and fight back

infraGard: Using CEOs as shock troops during a disaster

2008-02-10T14:44:00.000-05:00

Hey Gang,

Kittie forwarded this article to me from the
progressive about infragard. For those of you who
don't know this group has been the brainchild of a few
rightwing think tanks since the mid 1990s. It is a
business class TIPS program combined with a corporate
fascist disaster preparedness program. It is bigger
than I thought with chapters in every state (83
chapters in all) and over 22,000 corporate/industry
leaders in its membership (in fact 350 of the Fortune
500 are part of it). They basically work for the FBI
giving info and doing their bidding during "events"
which are terrorist attacks and disasters in return
they get special privelages and information. The first
of half of the article is mostly the ACLU complaining
(rightfully so) that this could be used against
workers trying to organize and invade all of our
privacy but the last part has to do with disasters and
a bit of Naomi Klein type of analysis.

the article can be read here:
http://www.progressive.org/mag_rothschild0308

website: www.infragard.net

Global Economic Cost of Climate Chaos

2008-02-02T19:03:00.000-05:00

The Stern Review published by
the British Treasury at the end of 2006 concluded that if the more dramatic predictions come to pass,
then inaction on climate change could cost the world economy more than 20% of global GDP each year
(whereas the costs of effective action could be limited to just 1% of global GDP each year).

http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternreview_index.cfm

Weather Chaos Could Trigger Civil Unrest

2008-02-02T18:51:00.000-05:00

A new article in the Toronto Star suggests that State security agencies look into
internal civil unrest scenarios as the climate begins to change. It comes from a
report entitled "An Uncertain Future: Law Enforcement,National Security
and Climate Change" by the Oxford Research Group.

The article:  http://www.thestar.com/World/Columnist/article/298018

The Report by Oxford Research Group: http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/uncertainfuture.php

Lawmakers admit Formaldehyde in FEMA Trailers

2008-01-29T18:54:00.000-05:00

Democratic leaders of a House science subcommittee alleged yesterday that the Federal Emergency Management Agency manipulated scientific research into the potential danger posed by a toxic gas emitted in trailers still housing tens of thousands of survivors of hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

FEMA "ignored, hid and manipulated government research on the potential impact of long-term exposure to formaldehyde" on Katrina and Rita victims now living in the FEMA trailers, the congressmen wrote in a letter to Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, whose department includes FEMA.

To read the entire Washington Post Article: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/28/AR2008012802429.html

National Security Report- Climate Change

2007-12-20T12:17:00.000-05:00

Want to read some scary stuff here is the national security report on climate change and the military.

http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/SecurityandClimate_Final.pdf

Beyond the Point of No Return

2007-12-20T12:04:00.000-05:00

Below is a longish essay by author, scientists and journalist about what the near future with run away climate change will be like.
http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2007/12/10/165845/92

On-Line Emergency courses

2007-12-08T12:58:00.001-05:00

I received a couple of positive notes about the TEEX on-line classes
that asked for more of similar kind of training.  Although I don't
like the Yale-New Haven Center for Preparedness & Disaster Response
courses as much as the TEEX, they are SHORT!.  Yale has seven free on-
line training sessions targeted to health care workers in a hospital
setting, that might be of interest.  Upon successful completion of
the multi-choice test, you can print a certificate.  Course subjects:
  - Bioterrorism for Clinicians
  - Personal Protective Equipment
  - Introduction to Emergency Management
  - Introduction to Radiological Emergency Preparedness
  - Introduction to Emergency Management with NIMS
  - Mental Health Aspects of Emergencies and Disasters
    for Non-Mental Health Professionals
  - ICS for Health Care with NIMS

Brief course descriptions have been copied from their website and
pasted below. 

The Center recommends taking these awareness level training before
going on technician & operational level classroom training. 

How To Take The Course:
If you wish to take any of the courses below, go to
http://ynhhs.emergencyeducation.org/ and log in using the blue box in
the left column of the home page. If you are a first-time user,
please click the "Register" button to establish your LoginID and
Password.

Important NYC-area SW Repeaters

2007-12-08T12:53:00.000-05:00

AFTERSHOCK REPEATER LIST

QUEENS

Flushing 440.700+445.700 -114.8 WB2HWW

ASTORIA 447.325- 100

ARES/EMERGENCY ONLY 440.650+445.650 110.9

FAR ROCKAWAY 444.550+449.550 NO 88.5

WOODSIDE (NOT SELF POWERED) 445.02 156.7

BROOKLYN

BENSONHURST 147.300+147.900no 146.2 KB2NGU

UNKNOWN 224.34-222.74no 136.5 (LINK WITH MANY OTHER REPEATERS)

FLATBUSH 440.200+445.200 88.5 (NOT AUTO)

SUNSET PARK 446.825-441.825 141.3

BRONX

NORTH CENTRAL 441.100+446.100 -136.5 N2ROW/R (fdny/ ares)

UNKNOWN 447.625-442.625No 136.5 N2HBA/R

BROOKLYN HEIGHTS 29.680 MHz -100 KHz 136.5 (ares)
Pl 136.5

MANHATTAN

UNKNOWN 147.000-146.400 136.5 (ARES NOT AUTO)

BILINGUAL 224.020- 222.420 123.0

TIMES SQUARE 434.575+439.575 136.5

BCARS/ALIVE 445.075-440.075 114.8

RED CROSS 449.6250-444.6250 88.5

NYC ARES 147.000-146.400 136.5

EMPIRE STATE 448.275-443.275 136.5

STATEN ISLAND

UNKNOWN 223.840-222.240 No 141.3

NORTH SHORE 448.475-443.475 97.4

TRI STATE

SYOSETTE/NASAU 448.025 MHz -5 MHz 136.5 (ares)

BOHEMIA/SUFFOLK 444.600 MHz +5 MHz 136.5 (ares)

NEW JERSEY/ RED CROSS 449.6250-444.6250 88.5

WHITE PLAINS/ EMERGENCY ONLY 440.650+445.650 PRIVATE 114.8

NYACK/ SKYWARN SYSTEM 147.165+147.765 114.8

WEST POINT 224.180-222.580 No 123.0

WESTCHESTER 146.91-146.310 yes 114.8

YONKERS 146.865+ 146.265 (OLDEST SP REPEATER IN THE REGION)

"Disaster response is class war by other means"

2007-10-31T21:51:00.000-04:00

We're not big fans of Greg Palast, but when it comes to the California fire response, we couldn't have said it better -

http://www.gregpalast.com/burn-baby-burnthe-california-celebrity-fires/

BURN BABY BURN – The California Celebrity Fires

What color is your disaster? It makes a difference. A life and death difference.

Dig:

Population of San Diego fire evacuation zone: 500,000
Population of the New Orleans flood evacuation zone: 500,000

White folk as a % of evacuees, San Diego: 66%
Black folk as % of evacuees, New Orleans: 67%

Size counts, too. Size of your wallet, that is:

Evacuees in San Diego, in poverty: 9%
Evacuees in New Orleans, in poverty: 27%

The numbers would be even uglier, though more revealing, if I included evacuees of the celebrity fire in Malibu.

...

In 2005, while the bodies were still being fished out of flooded homes in New Orleans, Republican Congressman Richard Baker praised The Lord for his mercy. “We finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn’t do it, but God did,” he said about the removal of the poor from the project near the French Quarter much coveted by speculators.

But as this week’s flames spread, no Republican Congressman cried, “Burn baby burn!” to praise the Lord for cleaning up the ‘Boo, the sin-and-surf playground of Hollywood luvvies.

In New Orleans, God’s covenant with real estate developers has been very profitable. Over 70,000 families remain, two years after the waters receded, in mobile home concentration centers far away from the N.O. re-building boom. Let’s see how long it takes to get Tom Hanks back on his beach towel.

Standing next to Governor Schwarzenegger, a smug little Bush said, “It makes a big difference when you have someone in the statehouse willing to take the lead” – a snide attack on the former Democratic Governor of Louisiana on whom the White House successfully dumped the blame for the horror show in New Orleans.

Mr. Bush never mentioned – and the media would never give away his secret – that 15 hours before the levees broke, the White House and FEMA knew the flood barriers were cracking, yet failed to inform the Governor and state police. Nor did Mr. Bush mention that his Department of Homeland Security’s FEMA trolls took away evacuation planning from the state and gave it to a crew of crony contractors who, for a million bucks, came up with a plan that came down to, “If a hurricane comes, get in your car and drive like hell.”

In California, plans were in place, money poured down with the flame retardant, and no one is suggesting that Mel Gibson move his swastika collection to a FEMA trailer.

Not comparable, the ‘Boo and the N.O.? You can say that again. But as a kid who grew up in the ass end of Los Angeles, I can tell you that disaster apartheid applies on the local scale as well. Look at the tarry filth of Compton and Long Beach shores versus the panicked reaction when a bit of garbage or oil sheen hits Malibu sands. (I remember, standing on the crude-covered shore of an Alaska Native village in March, 1991, the day Exxon announced it would end the clean-up from the Exxon Valdez spill. That same day, the papers showed the careful scouring that week of every pebble on Malibu beaches hit by dinky spill incident.)

...

What I’m saying is: Besides the flames, there’s a class war raging in America. Or, should I say, Class Massacre. Because only one side is taking all the bullets. Malibu, Beverly Hills, Santa Monica are “incorporated communities” – islands of privilege politically fenced off from the riff-raff sea of Los Angeles. These self-incorporated Bantustans of the wealthy have their own fire departments and schools. The money islands are relieved of having to pay for the schools and hospitals of the city where their gardeners live. (I can’t tell which is the worst disaster that can befall an Angelino – a fire, an earthquake or the LA public school system.)

Now, it’s easy to say it’s just George Bush who’s the class clown of the class war. But it’s an old story. When a flood took out the tony homes at Westhampton Dunes, the Clinton Administration picked up the full tab for rebuilding these summer hideaways of investment bankers. While today, death-by-poison stalks the environment of Black townships of Louisiana (the FEMA ‘guests’ are parked in a zone called Cancer Ally), Al Gore can’t be found. But when speaking of rising sea levels that can take out the homes of his buddies in ‘Boo or the Hamptons, Gore goes ga-ga.

The one thing I’ll say in favor of that vile little Louisiana Republican cheering the drowning of public housing residents, at least he's honest about how the system works. He’s not afraid to remind us of the gods’-honest truth: disaster response is class war by other means.

So let me not forget to report the war’s body count:

New Orleans flood deaths: 1,577.
California celebrity fire deaths: 5

Peru's earthquake & the Shock Doctrine

2007-10-04T20:15:00.000-04:00

"An earthquake is like a war situation arising from a foreign invasion. In situations like this we need a single chain of command, with less democracy and a more vertical command structure."
- Peruvian President Alan García

As can be seen by the above quote and through out the article (http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39134) the earthquake in Peru is being used by their local gov't and multinational contractors (Bechtel, Haliburton, ETC.) to impose ineffeciencent hierarchical measures to disrupt and retard spontaneous and effective self-organization.

Flood Risk US (Article)

2007-09-23T20:34:00.000-04:00

Rising seas likely to flood U.S. history

By SETH BORENSTEIN, AP Science Writer

Ultimately, rising seas will likely swamp the first American settlement in Jamestown, Va., as well as the Florida launch pad that sent the first American into orbit, many climate scientists are predicting.

In about a century, some of the places that make America what it is may be slowly erased.

Global warming — through a combination of melting glaciers, disappearing ice sheets and warmer waters expanding — is expected to cause oceans to rise by one meter, or about 39 inches. It will happen regardless of any future actions to curb greenhouse gases, several leading scientists say. And it will reshape the nation.

Rising waters will lap at the foundations of old money Wall Street and the new money towers of Silicon Valley. They will swamp the locations of big city airports and major interstate highways.

Storm surges worsened by sea level rise will flood the waterfront getaways of rich politicians — the Bushes' Kennebunkport and John Edwards' place on the Outer Banks. And gone will be many of the beaches in Texas and Florida favored by budget-conscious students on Spring Break.

That's the troubling outlook projected by coastal maps reviewed by The Associated Press. The maps, created by scientists at the University of Arizona, are based on data from the U.S. Geological Survey.

Few of the more than two dozen climate experts interviewed disagree with the one-meter projection. Some believe it could happen in 50 years, others say 100, and still others say 150.

Sea level rise is "the thing that I'm most concerned about as a scientist," says Benjamin Santer, a climate physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California.

"We're going to get a meter and there's nothing we can do about it," said University of Victoria climatologist Andrew Weaver, a lead author of the February report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in Paris. "It's going to happen no matter what — the question is when."

Sea level rise "has consequences about where people live and what they care about," said Donald Boesch, a University of Maryland scientist who has studied the issue. "We're going to be into this big national debate about what we protect and at what cost."

This week, beginning with a meeting at the United Nations on Monday, world leaders will convene to talk about fighting global warming. At week's end, leaders will gather in Washington with President Bush.

Experts say that protecting America's coastlines would run well into the billions and not all spots could be saved.

And it's not just a rising ocean that is the problem. With it comes an even greater danger of storm surge, from hurricanes, winter storms and regular coastal storms, Boesch said. Sea level rise means higher and more frequent flooding from these extreme events, he said.

All told, one meter of sea level rise in just the lower 48 states would put about 25,000 square miles under water, according to Jonathan Overpeck, director of the Institute for the Study of Planet Earth at the University of Arizona. That's an area the size of West Virginia.

The amount of lost land is even greater when Hawaii and Alaska are included, Overpeck said.

The Environmental Protection Agency's calculation projects a land loss of about 22,000 square miles. The EPA, which studied only the Eastern and Gulf coasts, found that Louisiana, Florida, North Carolina, Texas and South Carolina would lose the most land. But even inland areas like Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia also have slivers of at-risk land, according to the EPA.

This past summer's flooding of subways in New York could become far more regular, even an everyday occurrence, with the projected sea rise, other scientists said. And New Orleans' Katrina experience and the daily loss of Louisiana wetlands — which serve as a barrier that weakens hurricanes — are previews of what's to come there.

Florida faces a serious public health risk from rising salt water tainting drinking water wells, said Joel Scheraga, the EPA's director of global change research. And the farm-rich San Joaquin Delta in California faces serious salt water flooding problems, other experts said. "Sea level rise is going to have more general impact to the population and the infrastructure than almost anything else that I can think of," said S. Jeffress Williams, a U.S. Geological Survey coastal geologist in Woods Hole, Mass. Even John Christy at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, a scientist often quoted by global warming skeptics, said he figures the seas will rise at least 16 inches by the end of the century. But he tells people to prepare for a rise of about three feet just in case. Williams says it's "not unreasonable at all" to expect that much in 100 years. "We've had a third of a meter in the last century."

The change will be a gradual process, one that is so slow it will be easy to ignore for a while.

"It's like sticking your finger in a pot of water on a burner and you turn the heat on, Williams said. "You kind of get used to it."

Shock Doctrine

2007-09-22T15:45:00.000-04:00

A new book by Naomi Klein (from No Logo fame) about the role disasters and other shocks reinforce global capitalism. She even suggests that the orgins of modern capitalism is the result of disasters in the past. There is also a short award winning documentary by the director of Children of Men on her web-site which is excellent. You can info about the book and watch the video on Klein's new eb-site:

http://www.naomiklein.org/shock-doctrine/short-film

Peru Solidarity and Appeal for Action

2007-08-25T20:27:00.000-04:00

Earthquake leaves cities in ruins

The militants of the Grupo Qhispikay Llaqta is calling for a meeting of
all libertarians, friends and anyone interested, to be held on Sunday
at noon in Plaza Francia, to organize aid for the region hit by the
earthquake.
---Appeal for aid to Ica

Comrades and friends, everybody already knows about the disaster that
has
hit our brothers and sisters from the south of the country (Ica,
Chincha,
Pisco), besides the mountain areas of Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Ica,
southern Lima. Because of this, and irrespective of personal differences,
now is the moment to unite and show our solidarity, not only in words
but also through action.

The militants of the Grupo Qhispikay Llaqta is calling for a meeting of
all libertarians, friends and anyone interested, to be held on Sunday
at noon in Plaza Francia, bringing with us all that we can, such as:

blankets
used clothes in good condition
non-perishable foodstuffs
water
coats
tents
anything considered useful.

The city of Ica is also home to the comrades of the Ica No Pasiva
collective, though at the moment we have no news of them. All collected

donations will be sent then to Ica by means of a commission from the
Movimiento Nacional de Nats* Organizados del Perú (MNNATSOP - National

Movement of Organized Child and Teenage Workers of Peru) that has a
branch
in Avenida Arequipa. This organization of working youths is trustworthy

since we know about its work and we have had some previous contacts
with
them. There is also a possibility that some of us may take part in the
commission. Let's help the men, women, children, old people and
comrades
that live in the Ica area, who have nothing. While today we are with
our
families, many of these people now have no family and no home to spend
the
night. We cannot be indifferent.

Article Excerpts about Politics and Disasters from Harpers

2007-08-25T20:21:00.000-04:00

The Uses of Disaster: Notes on Bad Weather and Good Governments

By: Rebecca Solnit (Harpers 10/2005)

…The days after 9/11 constituted a tremendous national opening, as if a door had been unlocked. The aftermath of disaster is often peculiarly hopeful, and in the rupture of the ordinary, real change often emerges. But this means that disaster threatens not only bodies, buildings, and property but also the status quo. Disaster recovery is not just a rescue of the needy but also a scramble for power and legitimacy, one that the status quo usually-but not always-wins. The Bush Administration's response after 9/11 was a desperate and extreme version of this race to extinguish too vital a civil society and reestablish the authority that claims it alone can do what civil society has just done-and, alas, an extremely successful one. For the administration, the crisis wasn't primarily one of death and destruction but one of power. The door had been opened and an anxious administration hastened to slam it shut.

You can see the grounds for that anxiety in the aftermath of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, which was the beginning of the end for the one-party rule of the PRI over Mexico. The earthquake, measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale, hit Mexico City early on the morning of September 19 and devastated the central city, the symbolic heart of the nation. An aftershock nearly as large hit the next evening. About ten thousand people died, and as many as a quarter of a million became homeless.

The initial response made it clear that the government cared a lot more about the material city of buildings and wealth than the social city of human beings. In one notorious case, local sweatshop owners paid the police to salvage equipment from their destroyed factories. No effort was made to search for survivors or retrieve the corpses of the night-shift seamstresses. It was as though the earthquake had ripped away a veil concealing the corruption and callousness of the government. International rescue teams were rebuffed, aid money was spent on other programs, supplies were stolen by the police and army, and, in the end, a huge population of the displaced poor was obliged to go on living in tents for many years.

“Not even the power of the state,” wrote political commentator Carlos Monsivás, “managed to wipe out the cultural, political, and psychic consequences of the four or five days in which the brigades and aid workers, in the midst of rubble and desolation, felt themselves in charge of their own behavior and responsible for the other city that rose into view.”

To read the whole article go to: http://www.harpers.org/archive/2005/10/0080774

Flood/Hurricane Maps for NYC

2007-07-18T23:34:00.000-04:00

Below are links for flood and hurricane maps for NYC. Print them out since you won't be able to read the internet if something happens.

This is the Hurricane Preparedness brochure from the City, the red dots are evacuation centers
http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/downloads/pdf/hurricane_map_english_06.pdf

Here is a very detailed Climate Change/ Flood map via google earth. Very intersting
http://flood.firetree.net/

You will notice the stadiums are underwater even at a 1 meter sea level rise and a level 2 hurricane yet that is THE plan for all of us according to the Mayors office

FEMA to pay Home Depot & WalMart to provide Emergency Relief

2007-07-15T17:12:00.000-04:00

Disaster plan teams state and retailers
Stores, instead of FEMA, counted on to get supplies to the scene early

By TERRI LANGFORD
Copyright 2007 Houston Chronicle

When the next hurricane hits Texas, the Gulf region's recovery time may
depend less on the Federal Emergency Management Agency and much more on
Wal-Mart, H-E-B, Home Depot and other large retailers.

"If FEMA shows up, good," said Jack Colley, chief of the Governor's
Division of Emergency Management. ''But we're not waiting."

Call it one more example of the lingering Hurricane Katrina effect, but
Colley and his team are looking past the traditional
go-through-FEMA-to-get-ice kind of emergency management model.

This new strategy, borne during 2005's Hurricane Rita and fine-tuned in
the two years since by the state's emergency agency, has retailers
conducting mock drills alongside government officials.

"FEMA was an old contact point for ice, water, etc," Colley explained
from his agency's state operations center in the basement of Texas
Department of Public Safety headquarters in Austin. "The private sector
is willing and able to do this for us."

For the past two years, Colley and Texas Homeland Security Director
Steve McCraw have cultivated direct relationships with retailers after
watching Louisiana and Mississippi officials dial FEMA in vain for
food,
water and other aid.

"FEMA can't compete with the private sector," Colley said. "They do it
quicker, smarter, faster every day."

For the rest of this absurd article go to 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/4967735.html

AAA Planning Meeting

2007-06-21T21:03:00.001-04:00

We will be having a planning meeting on Monday 16th at 7pm at Tomkins Square Park (the grassy hill area)

All are welcome to attend there will be refreshments provided.

Black Flags & Windmills

2007-05-27T10:45:00.000-04:00

This is an anarchist examination of Common Ground Relief by one of the founders Scott Crow. He looks at why and how CG lost its anarchist identity. It is sincere and may hold possible lessons for our organizing.

The article can be found at: http://www.infoshop.org/inews/article.php?story=2007052622040421

Report about First Responders of Katrina

2007-05-22T21:05:00.000-04:00

This 18 page report is a result of interviewing hundreds of First Responders during the Katrina Disaster. It is interesting reading from University of Colorado

http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/research/qr/qr189/qr189.pdf

Report Back from Kansas Mutual Aid

2007-05-20T14:02:00.001-04:00

Somewhere over the Rainbow: A report from a Kansas Mutual Aid member from tornado devastated Greensburg, Kansas

by Dave Strano

On Saturday May 12, four members of Kansas Mutual Aid, a Lawrence based class struggle anarchist collective traveled to the small South Central Kansas town of Greensburg. Our intention was to go as a fact-finding delegation, to report back to the social justice movement in Lawrence on what exactly was happening in the city.

On Friday May 4, 2007 Greensburg was almost completely destroyed by a F5 tornado. 97% of the buildings in the town of 1500 were destroyed or damaged beyond repair. Nearly every single resident was left homeless, jobless, and devastated. At least eleven people died in the storm, and hundreds of companion animals, livestock, and wild animals were killed as well.

According to the 2000 census, 97% of the population of Greensburg was white, and the median income of the population was a meager $28,000. The city was and still is comprised of overwhelmingly poor, white working people.

Shortly after the tornado, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) took control of the recovery efforts in Greensburg. The United Way became the coordinating organization for relief volunteers but, after orders came from FEMA, halted the flow of volunteers into Greensburg. FEMA demanded that Greensburg needed to be "secured" before the area could be opened to real recovery efforts.

So, as hundreds of recovery volunteers were told to not come to Greensburg by the United Way, hundreds of police from dozens of Kansas jurisdictions were mobilized to enter the city and establish "control."

Reports coming from the recovery effort in Greensburg had been woefully short of information. We made multiple phone calls to the United Way and other aid agencies, and were told repeatedly not to come, that “We don’t need volunteers at this time.” We were told that if we wanted to help, we should just make a financial donation to the Salvation Army or United Way.

With the experiences of Katrina and other major disasters fresh in our collective conscious, we decided to go anyway, to assess the situation and be able to present a better picture to those people in Lawrence that were rightfully concerned about the effectiveness of the relief efforts.

On the night of Friday May 11, in the spirit of offering solidarity to the working class population of Greensburg, members of KMA traveled two hours to Wichita and spent the night there. A mandatory curfew had been imposed on Greensburg, with no one being able to be in the city between 8pm and 8am. So after a nearly sleepless night, we piled into our vegetable oil burning car and made the final two hour drive to Greensburg, careful to not arrive before 8.

Multiple news agencies had reported that because of FEMA, all volunteers were being denied entry at the checkpoints set up outside the city. As we approached the checkpoint, we became really nervous, and tried to make sure we had our story straight.

We were stopped by an armed contingent of Kansas Highway Patrol Officers. We explained that we had come to help with the relief efforts, and after a quick stare and glance into our car, the officer in charge directed us to a red and white tent about half a mile into the town.

It turned out that on Friday the 11th, a week after the tornado destroyed Greensburg, the Americorps organization was finally given permission to establish and coordinate volunteer recovery efforts. Americorps members from St. Louis had set up their base of operations in a large red and white canopy tent that was also being used a meeting place for the residents of the city.

Americorps volunteers proved to be pretty reliable for information, and good contacts to have made while we were down there. Despite the hierarchical and contradictory aims of the national organization, the Americorps people on the ground were the only people really offering any physical recovery aid to the residents of Greensburg.

The four of us from KMA, signed in to the volunteer tent and were given red wristbands that were supposed to identify us as aid workers. We decided not to wait to be assigned a location to work, and instead to travel around the city on foot and meet as many local people as we could.

Our primary goals were numerous. We intended to analyze the situation and assess how our organization could help from Lawrence. If long term physical aid was needed from us, we had to make contacts within the local populace that could offer a place to set up a base camp. We also intended to find out what happened to the prisoners in the county jail during and after the storm, and what the current procedure for those being arrested was. In a highly militarized city, the police and military were the biggest threat to personal safety.

As we traveled further into the ravaged town, it became clear that the photographs I had seen had not done justice to what truly had happened here. All that could be seen was endless devastation in every direction. There wasn’t a single building in this area of the town that had been left standing. The devastation was near complete. Every single house we came across in the first moments we entered the town had completely collapsed. Every single tree was mangled and branchless. Memories of watching post-nuclear warfare movies filled my head as we walked around the city.

This was a post-apocalyptic world. The city was eerily empty for the most part. National Guard troops patrolled in Hummers and trucks. Occasionally, a Red Cross or Salvation Army truck would drive by. Very few residents were there working on their homes.

After a short while, we met with several people evacuating belongings from their home. They told us that FEMA had been there for a week, and that all FEMA could offer them was a packet of information. The packet, however, had to be mailed to the recipients, and they had no mailing address! Their entire house had been destroyed. Their mailbox was probably in the next county. All they were left to do was evacuate what few belongings could be saved from their house, and then pull the non-salvageable belongings and scraps of their house to the curb for the National Guard trash crews to haul away.

No agency in the city besides Americorps was offering to help with the removal of this debris, or the recovery of people’s homes. FEMA’s mission was to safeguard the property of businesses in the area and offer “low interest” loans to property owners affected. The National Guard was on hand along with the local police, to act as the enforcement mechanism for FEMA, while occasionally hauling debris and garbage out of the city.

The only building in the city that FEMA and others were working in or around was the County Courthouse. When we approached this area, we quickly took notice of the giant air-conditioned FEMA tour buses, along with dozens of trailers that were now housing the City Hall, police dispatch centers, and emergency crews.

The media had reported that residents of the city would be receiving FEMA trailers similar to the ones in New Orleans. The only FEMA trailer I saw was being occupied by police.

At this location, we tried to formulate some answers as to what had happened to any prisoners being housed in the county jail during the storm, as well as the fate of the at least seven people that had been arrested since the storm.

Not a single person could offer us a real answer. As of the writing of this article, we are still working to find the answer to that question. We have ascertained that any prisoners that were in Greensburg during the storm were sent to Pratt County Jail immediately after the storm had subsided. However, we still don’t know how many people that accounts for, nor do we know the fate of any arrestees in the week since.

Several of the arrestees after the storm were soldiers from Fort Riley that were sent in to secure the town. They have been accused of “looting” alcohol and cigarettes from a grocery store. The residents I talked to said that they had been told that the soldiers had just returned from Iraq. Is it a wonder that they would want to get drunk the first chance they could? The social reality of this situation was beginning to really set in. The city was in chaos, not because of the storm, but because of FEMA and the police.

In the immediate recovery after the storm, FEMA and local police not only worked to find survivors and the dead, but also any firearms in the city. As you pass by houses in Greensburg, you notice that some are spraypainted with how many weapons were recovered from the home. This is central Kansas, a region with extremely high legal gun ownership. Of the over 350 firearms confiscated by police immediately after the storm, only a third have been returned to their owners. FEMA and the police have systematically disarmed the local population, leaving the firepower squarely in control of the state.

Later in the day we traveled with an Americorps volunteer that turned out to be the sister of one of the members of the Lawrence anti-capitalist movement. She gave us a small driving tour of the rest of the devastation that we hadn’t seen yet, and then deposited us in front of a house of a family that was busy trying to clear out their flooded basement.

Two days of rain had followed the tornado, and with most houses without roofs, anything left inside the house that may have survived the initial storm, was destroyed or at risk of being destroyed. The casualties of the storm weren’t just structures and cars… they were memories and loved ones, in the forms of photographs, highschool yearbooks, family memorabilia and momentos. People’s entire lives had been swept away by the storm.

We joined in the effort to help clear the basement, and listened to the stories of the storm that the family told us. They explained that they had just spent their life savings remodeling the basement, and now it was gone. It had survived just long enough to save them and some neighbors from the storm.

We removed whatever belongings were left in the basement, and sorted the belongings into five piles. The smallest of the piles by far, as the pile of things that were salvageable and worth keeping. The other piles included one for wood debris, one for metal, one for hazardous waste, and another pile for anything else that needed to be removed. From under one of the piles, a scent of rotting flesh wafted through the air. The family was afraid to look and see what may be hidden under the metal.

As we were preparing to leave the work site after clearing the entire basement, we were thanked heartily by the family and their friends. “Next time,” one of them said, “bring fifty more with you.”

Next time we will. It should be obvious to most by now, that the federal, state, and local governments that deal with disasters of this magnitude are not interested in helping the poor or working people that are really impacted. Only through class solidarity from other working people and working together with neighbors and community members will the people of Greensburg be able to survive and rebuild.

Kansas Mutual Aid is in the midst of organizing a more permanent and structured relief effort. We are continuing to make contacts to secure a base camp for our work. We hope to have things organized and solidified by Memorial Day Weekend when we plan to travel back with as many people, tools, and supplies we can take.

Our goals are three fold:

1) To provide direct physical relief support to the residents of Greensburg by being on hand to help salvage their homes, and provide any other physical support they ask of us.

2) To offer solidarity and aid in any future organizing or agitating efforts that will be needed to retain possession of their homes, or to acquire any other physical aid they demand from the government or other agencies.

3) To provide support and protection of human rights during the police and military occupation of the city. We will work to document arrests and ensure that human rights of arrestees are protected.

If you live in Eastern Kansas, or are willing to travel, we need your help and experience. We also need a laundry list of supplies including:

Money for fuel for our vehicles
Respirators and filtered face masks
Headlamps and flashlights (none of the city has power, and there are a lot of basements that will need to be worked in)
Shovels, pickaxes, prybars, crowbars, sledgehammers, and heavy duty rakes
Gloves, boots, goggles, construction helmets and other protective clothing
First Aid supplies
Water and Food (non-perishable) for volunteers heading down
Chainsaws and Gasoline
Portable generators
You and your experience

Please, if you have anything you can offer, or want to help in the relief, e-mail us at kansasmutualaid@hotmail.com

We will be hosting a presentation on Monday May 21st at the Solidarity Center in downtown Lawrence (1109 Mass Street) at 7pm on our experiences in Greensburg, and on our plans to offer relief in the form of solidarity and mutual aid, and not as charity. Please join us if you can.

There seems like there is much more to say, but with the experience fresh in my mind, it’s hard to keep typing. Action and organization is needed more than a longer essay at this moment. In love and solidarity,
Dave Strano
Kansas Mutual Aid member
Lawrence, Kansas

Disaster background about Greensburg

2007-05-20T13:52:00.000-04:00

Disasters of our Age: From Fallujah to Greensburg

By Joe Carr

5-12-2007

I spent last Saturday in Greensburg, Kansas, and I can barely describe the devastation I saw there. I wish that I could say I’ve never seen anything like it, but the destruction and official response was hauntingly similar to what I witnessed in Palestine and Iraq during my trips there from 2003-2005.

Greensburg is a small central Kansas town of about 1,400 people. A largely white working class city, the median income is $28,000, leaving almost 20% of the population under the official poverty line. On Friday, May 4th, a 1.7 mile-wide tornado (possibly the largest ever recorded) destroyed or damaged 95% of the city, killing 9 people. Most residents lost everything and have not been able to return.

We called the United Way last week about going down to help, and they told us that they didn’t need any more volunteers and to just send money. Upon further pressing, they admitted that there was a lot of work to do, but they didn’t have a good system for coordinating volunteers. Other news sources were saying that National Guard troops had sealed off the city and no one was being allowed in. We decided to head down there and see for ourselves.

The checkpoint was much easier to get through than any checkpoint I experienced in Iraq or Palestine. But it was new for me to be questioned by armed military personnel in order to enter a US city. The town is very much under military occupation, armored hummers and trucks patrol the streets, along with police from all over the state. Indeed, I saw more police and military vehicles than construction equipment, despite Kansas having over half its machinery and many of its National Guard troops deployed to Iraq. You can bet that if there was a social uprising in a US city, the National Guard would be sent in full force to repress it like we saw in the 60’s and 70’s. But when people actually need help, our troops and equipment are busy terrorizing and destabilizing Iraq.

Entering a Greensburg neighborhood was overwhelming. Absolute destruction in all directions as far as the eye can see. It brought me right back to Fallujah, Iraq, which I visited with the Christian Peacemaker Teams in May of 2005. US Troops destroyed 70% of that city of 150,000. However, I witnessed more people rebuilding in Fallujah than in Greensburg, despite a much more serious military occupation and severe restrictions on importing building materials in Fallujah. There were hardly any Greensburg homeowners out cleaning up their property, and government agencies seemed only focused on repairing government buildings or policing the streets.

Though we had trouble getting information or guidance on how to volunteer, we were followed around by an Overland Park police vehicle for over an hour. They were quite blatant about it, driving close behind us at every turn, and slowly following us as we walked. We learned later that there are ten Lawrence cops in Greensburg who likely recognized us from our political activity and took the opportunity to try and intimidate us.

Government officials finally addressed the residents of Greensburg at a large town meeting held last Friday, May 11th, under a large tent on the edge of town. Citizens were told that they would be fully responsible for cleaning up their property and hauling away the rubble. Aid will largely come in the form of 2.785% loans from the Small Business Administration (SBA), but will be based on the applicant’s ability to pay. Citizens will still be required to pay property tax on their destroyed lot; the city is only waving the interest and other fees. FEMA is offering a maximum of $28,200 to eligible residents, and it is clear that much of the poor and uninsured will largely be left with nothing.

One man I spoke to, an uninsured renter, said he lost everything and is left only with debt. We passed by a destroyed grocery store, and I asked him if people had tried to get food in the aftermath of the storm. “I’m not a looter” he said vehemently. Surprised, I commented that trying to get food in a time like that is hardly looting. “There wasn’t time to get food”, he said, “We had to pull people out of the rubble, and…. I lost a friend.”

We spent a few hours hauling damaged property out of one family’s home. They were actually one of the luckier ones. They lost everything, but had full-cost insurance and will qualify for an SBA loan. Their roof was ripped off and most the walls were destroyed. The basement (recently remodeled for $20,000) was then flooded in the following downpour and now reeks of mildew. The older couple survived the storm in that basement, along with four other neighbors who didn’t have basements. They’d lived in the house for 32 years, and were hoping to leave it to their children. As we hauled out everything from their basement, I imagined trying to clean everything out my parent’s basement and what a project that would be. At first this family had pretty much decided they would abandon the lot and live out the rest of their lives else ware, but after the town meeting they’re considering staying.

Stories of determination to return and rebuild were everywhere. Some people who’d planned to move away before the storm, have now decided that they’re going to band with the rest of the community and help re-create their city. It reminds me very much of the determination of Iraqi and Palestinian refugees to return to their homes, also echoed by the survivors of Hurricane Katrina from New Orleans. All of these refugees have the right to return to their homes, and we will continue working to make that possible.

Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebilius has vowed to make the city a “Green City”, using environmentally friendly building designs, though largely limited to increased insulation and more efficient heating and cooling systems. This idea reminds me of the real cause of these national disasters. Scientists say that the recent intensification of these storms can be linked to the global climate change caused by excessive CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were related to this, as was the recent flooding in Missouri that damaged at least 570 homes. Unless there is a drastic shift in US environmental and energy policy, these storms will only get worse.

The official response will continue to be militarization and political game-playing. Our government’s actions in the Middle East make it clear that their priorities are more death and destruction, not less. The abandonment and criminalization of Katrina survivors, the attacks on victims of our immigration policy disaster, and the growing crisis in our prison-industrial complex remind us that those living on American soil will also be targets.

It’s up to grassroots movements to bring change. We must continue to resist US war and occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan and US support for Israeli colonization of Palestine. We must continue to develop models to support the survivors of environmental policy disasters, such as the Common Ground collective coordinating relief work in New Orleans. www.commonground.com

The Kansas Mutual Aid collective based in Lawrence, KS, will be helping coordinate grassroots relief efforts in Greensburg. Please contact us if you would like to volunteer, help organize a group of volunteers, or donate equipment or supplies: kansasmutualaid@hotmail.com

We will be doing a presentation on what we saw in Greensburg and discussing ways to get involved on Monday, May 21st at 7pm at the Solidarity Center, 1109 Massachusetts in Lawrence, KS.

Our next big trip will be Memorial Day Weekend, May 26-28th. We have a school bus for transportation and will arrange for accommodations.

Please get involved now to support your fellow Midwesterners, you never know when you’re going to need it.

In solidarity

-Joe Carr
Kansas Mutual Aid
kansasmutualaid@hotmail.com

Anarchist First Responders Stopped by Cops, FBI & FEMA

2007-05-20T13:50:00.001-04:00

Tornado Ravaged Greensburg, Kansas:
Kansas Mutual Aid Relief Workers forced out of city by police

Saturday May 19, 2007
by Dave Strano

Infoshop News

On Saturday May 19, five members and volunteers affiliated with Kansas
Mutual Aid, a Lawrence based class struggle anarchist collective, made
the trek back to Greensburg to again help in relief efforts in the
tornado ravaged city. A week earlier, four KMA members had traveled to
Greensburg on a fact finding mission to assess the situation there. What
KMA members found was a militarized, entirely destroyed city where
relief efforts were moving tragically slow.

Today's trip back to Greensburg by KMA members and volunteers was
intended to solidify the bonds we had created in the first trip, and
establish a base of operations for future relief efforts. KMA spent the
morning working on a house with members of AmeriCorps, and then
proceeded to meet with contacts with the Mennonite Disaster Services.

We then headed out of town to a church just outside of city limits that
we were told would be a place we could probably set up a base camp for
our work. The church had been converted into a fire station by the
state, so we continued down the road and met a farmer who was willing to
work with us and let us use his land.

Soon after meeting the farmer, we were approached by officers with the
Dickinson County Sheriff's Department. After a brief exchange, the
officers left, and we were told to report to the Kiowa County Emergency
Response Command Post to receive official permission to set up our base
of operations. We were notified that if we did not do so, we would risk
having our operation ceased by the state.

Two of our delegation went to the Command Post, while the other three of
us went to the County Courthouse to pick up some water and provisions
being offered by the Red Cross. While we were picking up water and food,
I was approached by an Olathe Police Officer named Ty Moeder who knew my
face and identity. I was ordered to take my hands out of my pockets and
follow the officer to a side street "to avoid making a scene".

I and the other people with me followed the officer, and were repeatedly
ordered to keep our hands out of our pockets, where they could be seen
by the officer. Soon more officers approached, as well as at least one
member of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, and some people from FEMA.
Surrounded by agents of the state, we were ordered to produce our
identification.

When I asked the police why we were being detained, Officer Moeder
responded "We need to check to see if you are affiliated with the
anarchists." At this moment, our remaining two comrades approached to
see what was happening. They were detained as well, and made to produce
their identification.

Officer Moeder asked how we had gotten in to the city. "We drove in,"
someone replied.

"They weren't supposed to let you in at the road block," responded
Moeder, seemingly frustrated and perplexed by that answer.

"They even gave us a day pass to drive in and out," we shot back.

A waiting game ensued for the next several minutes, with more officers
approaching, now numbering almost fifteen. A Lawrence police officer
approached, and was ordered to take photos of the car we had driven that
was parked down the street. Officer McNemee from the Lawrence Police
Department took extensive photos of the car, even of the inside contents
of the vehicle.

Officer Moeder ordered me to step away from the rest of the relief
workers and speak with him. "You're being ordered to leave and not
return. This is not negotiable, not appealable. You can't change it. If
you return you'll be arrested on site. And believe me, you don't want to
push that right now. This system is pretty messed up, and you wouldn't
be issued bail. You'd disappear in the system."

I asked repeatedly what we had done and why we were being ordered to
leave the city. "You're part of a dangerous anarchist group that will
only drain our security resources," he responded. "We've been monitoring
your website and e-mails, we know what kind of agenda you have."

"So this is about our political beliefs?" I asked.

"No," he responded. "This is about you being federal security threats.
Kansas Mutual Aid is not welcome in this city, end of story. I know you
are going through legitimate means to work in the city, and you're story
seems picture perfect, but we know who you are, and you're not allowed
here."

We were ordered back into our car and escorted out of the city by
several police vehicles with their lights flashing, and left just
outside the city.

We returned to Lawrence just moments ago, unhindered in our resolve to
provide support to the people in the disaster area. We will continue to
work in whatever capacity we can in the areas around the city that we
may still be allowed into, and provide support to those entering the city.

The area is a police state, to be certain. Police and Law Enforcement
from across Kansas and the country are making the rules about
everything. Relief workers were banned from Greensburg today because of
their political beliefs and work against oppression and tyrannical state
control.

A longer, more in depth update with an announcement for future action
will come soon. Please spread this story far and wide.

In love and solidarity,
Dave Strano, on behalf of KMA

Anatomy of a Disaster

2007-04-29T20:15:00.000-04:00

Anatomy of Disasters

Researchers for the government have been studying “Disaster Psychology” for decades and have collected tons of materials related to the psychological, sociological (and covertly the political) effects of disasters. Below is some of their findings.

“Traumatic events can generate feelings of powerlessness and a perception of being out of control as well as the capacity to impact all aspects of a community's life, regardless of educational background or socio-economic level. “

“Most people pull together and function during and after a disaster, but their effectiveness is diminished. “
Survivors may go through distinct emotional phases following a disaster:
In the impact phase, survivors do not panic and may, in fact, show no emotion. They do what they must to respond to the situation and keep themselves and their families alive.
In the inventory phase, which immediately follows the event, survivors asses damage and try to locate other survivors. During this phase, many discard routine social ties in favor of the more functional relationships required for initial response activities, such as searching out family members and seeking medical assistance.
In the rescue phase, emergency services personnel are responding and survivors take direction from them without protest. They trust that rescuers will address their needs and that they can then put their lives back together quickly.
In the recovery phase, survivors may believe that rescue efforts are not proceeding quickly enough. That feeling, combined with other emotional stressors (for example, dealing with insurance adjustors, or living in temporary accommodations), may cause survivors to pull together AGAINST those who are trying to help them.

Taking care of others following a traumatic event . . .
Listen carefully
Spend time with the traumatized person
Offer your assistance and a listening ear even if they have not asked for help
Help them with everyday tasks like cleaning, cooking, caring for children etc . . .
Give them time to be alone
Help them stay away from alcohol and drugs
Keep in mind what they've been through
Don't try to explain it away
Don't tell them that they are lucky it wasn't worse
Don't take their anger, other feelings or outbursts personally
Insurrectory Mutual Aid affinity groups must be flexible, able to adapt to the needs of a changing situation.Part of the organizational challenge following a disaster is to be able to:
◦ Size up the scope and requirements of the situation. The best way to do this is draw heavily on local community groups.◦ Identify resources as they become available. “Disaster areas almost always have resources it is the distribution networks that may no longer be available” (FEMA) ◦ Deploy those resources within already existing social networks (e.g. community centers).As an individual responder, you must be ready to function in various roles perhaps and wear more than one "hat" at a time or "change hats" as the availability of resources changes. You must begin by assessing and managing your own personal situation, then that of the immediately adjacent area (neighborhood), and then join others in forming response teams based on affinity. This type of concentric development results in an evolving self-organizing structure and requires flexibility in its members

If you wish to join our Listserv

2007-04-27T22:31:00.000-04:00

We now have a new moderated and private listserv covering the topics of climate chaos, emergency preparedness and disasters from a radical grassroots perspective. If you are interested, send an email to the moderators at greenapplecollective@yahoo.com

Insurrectionary Mutual Aid

2007-04-27T19:25:00.000-04:00

From the Curious George Brigade zine.

From Mobilizations to Insurrectory Mutual Aid

While too many anarchists wring their hands about the end of the rollicking anti-globalization mobilizations of the last decade, others are conspiring a resistance of direct action in places where we have a chance to win. The truth is that while we learned many valuable organizational and tactical lessons during the years after Seattle, most of our energy was spent on largely symbolic actions. The real strength of these mobilizations was actually in the organizing: the ability to awaken many people to the possibility of resistance to global capitalism, as well as providing a catalyst for regional and international networks. At no point did these mobilizations actually threaten to end world capitalism or seriously challenge State power. or even liberate any socio-geographical territory. As anarchists, now is not the time to mourn the death of “anti-globe” mobilizations, but move to the next phase of our resistance – Insurrectory Mutual Aid.

Insurrection - an organized rebellion aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of subversion, sabotage and direct resistance -calling in question the legitimacy and efficacy of the government.

It is through acting and learning to act that we will open a path to insurrection. Propaganda does have a role, but that role is limited to clarifying actions not inciting them, since its context is dependent on the actions of people. Simply put: waiting only teaches waiting; in acting one learns to act.

The force of an insurrection is not the state’s military response, but the social upheaval it generates. Beyond the surface of the armed clash, the importance of any particular revolt should be evaluated by how it managed to expand the paralysis of normality in a given area and beyond. The Zapatistas are a recent example of this. Their limited military clash, less than ten days long and 150 people killed, with the government at San Cristobal on New Year’s day 1994 was an example of insurrection. It was a success, not because of a stunning military victory, but because it was able to disrupt normality in Chiapas which is still going on to this day. Recently the Zapatistsa have used this base in Chiapas to launch a new challenge to the legitimacy of the Mexican State and have expanded beyond Chiapas.

It is this potential expansion that gives an insurrection its power and drives the fear behind the state’s reaction. In a crisis or emergency situation, fortune favors the rebel, since, crises are by nature (if only temporarily) beyond the control of government forces. Governments have numerous contingencies to deal with a variety of “acceptable variations” [actual term used in FEMA documents] however they lack imagination and the lumbering bureaucracy that dominates all governments make it difficult to react to new situations. If it falls outside their imaginations they are at a loss to improvise. It can be a short step from emergency to the emergence of self-organized resistance. Argentina is one recent example of how an economic crisis can transform itself into a real counter-force to capitalism and the state.

Mutual Aid – a voluntary giving or lending of resources, labor or goods to others in a shared community/communities with the expectation that the entire community will in turn benefit.

Mutual Aid is a concept that is familiar to many anarchists, but often not fully understood. Mutual aid is not charity nor is it some baroque bartering system. It rejects the “tit-for-tat” psychology of modern capitalism while challenging the nightmare of communist distribution. Mutual aid is freely given help (in the form of services and resources) to others in our community. The idea is that as individuals in the community help each other the entire community benefits and that in turn supports the individuals own goals. It is not dissimilar to the simple concept of sharing. Mutual aid , like charity, central communism and capitalism, promotes a specific ideological system. In the case of mutual aid it supports a libertarian ideology where individuals are trusted to make economic decisions that promote the entire community.

The state and its flunkies work from a position that charity is an effective tool to re-establish the status quo. In its most recent report on Katrina, FEMA summarized the state’s logic on providing assistance to affected people: “All aid should be used strategically. The use of sustainable supplies must be administered in such a way to maximize compliance with the emergency plan. Unfortunately, this may delay some aid but the primacy of maintaining control in the first few days can not be underestimated.”

It comes as no surprise that our leaders are willing to let us die while they implement their misguided plans to maintain law and order. It is during this period of government hesitation that we need to be on the ground providing real solidarity for those the state is afraid of and indifferent to. Solidarity is more than holding protests, organizing fundraisers and filing indymedia reports. Real solidarity requires commitment, risk and preparedness. Mutual aid is a direct challenge to the government and the associated NGOs and religious institutions that monopolize “helping people.” Mutual aid by necessity promotes an egalitarian relationship between individuals and groups, where charity and government aid have buttress hierarchical relationships of dependence (at best) and oppression (more often). Through the solidarity of mutual aid, we can show our commitment to those excluded by the government emergency managers and truly reclaim the tactic of Propaganda by the Deed.

However, to be effective we need to prepare now. The influx of supplies and labor to locally affected communities—that we share affinity with—could mean the difference between the streets of Argentina and the stadiums of Louisiana. We must be prepared if a crisis happens tomorrow. A crisis is not the time to have fundraisers to get initial supplies. We need to be work on getting these things now, so when an emergency occurs, we can act immediately.

Showing up during a crisis is not like summit hopping. Any insurrectionist needs to be self-sufficient in the basics and have ready access to extra supplies of: food, water, medications, power, communications and shelter. It should be obvious in emergency situations one can not simply arrive and expect to plug-in to an already organized network. Unprepared radicals can actually put a strain on scarce resources by showing up unprepared. When hundreds of well-intentioned college kids flooded New Orleans during their spring break; it did not turn out to be the boon organizers first had hopped for. The students came without adequate clothes, food, water, shelter and so on. One organizer spent an entire afternoon tracking down some medication for a student who had assumed they could they important prescription filled at a local drugstore. The organizers were swamped with the logistics of supporting these hundreds of volunteers and organizing them to do meaningful and much needed work. The Food Not Bombs people provide a positive example on how groups of people can organize themselves and be adequately prepared enough so the focus can be on the work that needs to be done. In the weeks following the hurricane more than a hundred Food Not Bomb and related volunteers served thousands of meals to those in need. They had their own shelter, communications and supplies. The local communities did not need to waste limited energy and resources on these volunteers.

An insurrectionary must also be prepared to deal with real risk. Anti-Globalization mobilizations did a good job of training and preparing us for possible arrests and police brutality. Even though the majority of protestors were never arrested or beaten with billy-clubs, the very real possibility of state violence allowed one to decide what levels of risk one was willing to engage in with their affinity groups. We need to be just as honest and talk with those in our affinity groups about what level of risk we are willing to crisis mobilizations. During emergencies all sorts of laws change and the risk of arrests are greatly heightened along with real violence from the state and others. Real solidarity is taking similar risks as those most affected, not just sitting on the side-lines wishing they luck.

Insurrectory Mutual Aid is difficult high risk activity that requires a substantial of resources and preparedness. It is reasonable to ask if this tactics is worth it. As anarchists, the revolution is our constant point of reference, precisely because it is a concrete event; it must be built daily through more modest attempts which do not have all the liberating characteristics of the social revolution in the true sense. These more modest attempts are insurrections. In them the uprising of the most exploited and excluded of society and the most politically sensitized minority opens the way to the possible involvement of increasingly wider strata of exploited on a flux of rebellion which could lead to revolution. It is never possible to see the outcome of a specific struggle in advance. Even a limited struggle can have the most unexpected consequences. The passage from the various insurrections – limited and circumscribed – to revolution can never be guaranteed in advance by any method.

Below are some advantages and difficulties involved in practicing Inusrrectory Mutual Aid

The Advantages of Insurrectory Mutual Aid

Ø Crisis allows us to refocus and put our energies back into direct action.

Ø Connects us with folks that may have never heard about anarchism.

Ø Challenge the State and the capitalists on a more even playing field.

Ø Allow us to test out our assumptions about how societies can be organized along anarchist principles.

Ø Reinvigorate our anarchist networks by coming together for crisis mobilizations.

Ø Provide more permanent socio-geographic areas for further resistance.

Ø Access to public exposure.

Ø Fighting for something, instead of against things.

Ø Learn a new skill set that may be more appropriate for wide-spread militant resistance.

Difficulties

Ø The stakes are much higher; people could get into serious trouble.

Ø The events are spontaneous (as oppose to scheduled events) so it is harder to plan for.

Ø Requires greater mobility

Ø Requires decisiveness. There is often only a small window of opportunity.

Ø Greater demand on a functioning inter-network communications system. Issurectionaries need to develop a real-time multiply redundant communications system beyond just the internet.

Ø Often requires complex logistics.

Ø Means working in areas that may have entrenched and baroque internal interests and politics- which we may know very little about.

Ø Greater need for self-sufficiency.

Mutual Aid is not charity! It is an attack!